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Volume 8

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
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ABSTRACT

A general description of the Flight Safety Prediction Technique, and the documentation associated with its specific application to the O-2A and O-2B aircraft, are presented.

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GLOSSARY

This glossary presents general definitions of terms used in this report. The reader will find certain of these terms defined in somewhat different words in the text, depending on the context of the discussion; but the meaning will be consistent with the definitions given here.

- | | |
|---------------------|--|
| Criticality | - A numerical index of the significance of equipment failure history relative to aircraft safety. As an analysis parameter, it can be considered proportional to the likelihood that an item will fail and thereby cause an accident. It is the product of the failure probability and the sensitivity of an equipment item. |
| Dependency | - See link dependency. |
| FSPT | - Flight Safety Prediction Technique |
| Flight Phases | - Discrete segments of the aircraft mission profile. For present purposes, the flight phases are defined as 1) startup and taxi, 2) takeoff, 3) climb, 4) cruise, 5) tactics, 6) cruise, 7) descend, 8) land, and 9) taxi and shutdown. |
| Functional Analysis | - The determination of equipment relationships to aircraft functions performed, and the interrelationships of these functions. |
| Functional Link | - The simplest form of functional relationship in which one function is dependent upon the next lower function. |
| Functional Path | - The compilation of functional links, in sequence, through which a function is identified as being dependent upon another. |
| Link Dependency | - The conditional probability of a dependent function failing, given that a particular function it is dependent upon has failed. |
| Provisory Condition | - Operation of an aircraft in a mode or environment such that the safety-related importance of certain equipments is increased. Provisory conditions include icing, night flight, supersonic flight, etc. |
| Provisory Factor | - The probability that a provisory condition exists. Also used to describe the coded notation used to indicate that a functional relationship is dependent on a particular provisory condition. |
| Safety Sensitivity | - Same as "sensitivity". |

Sensitivity

- A quantitative indication of the degree of safety degradation to be expected if a function or piece of equipment fails. The more specific terms are "functional sensitivity" or "equipment item sensitivity".

Sensitivity Path

- A particular sequence of functional dependencies (beginning at the top level in the hierarchical structure) through which a function or piece of equipment derives a sensitivity value. Equipment and functional sensitivity values are often derived through several such sensitivity paths.

FOREWORD

This document is part of a 16-volume report describing the application to specific aircraft types of ARINC Research Corporation's Flight Safety Prediction Technique (FSPT). The technique was developed under previous Air Force contracts (see Appendix A). The present effort, undertaken in 1972 under Contract F09603-72-A-1132-SA01, has led to further refinement of the FSPT through its broad application to many different types of aircraft. The flight safety models generated for these aircraft are presented in individual volumes of this report as follows:

<u>Volume</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Volume</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>
2	T-38	10	B-52G, H
3	F-111A, FB-111A	11	C-130E
4	A-7D	12	KC-135
5	F-4D, E; and RF-4C	13	C-5A
6	C-141	14	T-39
7	A-37	15	F-15
8	O-2	16	UH-1N Helicopter
9	OV-10		

Volume 16 will document the results of a feasibility study of extending the FSPT to rotary-wing aircraft.

Volume 1, an overall summary of the contractual effort, will be issued at the end of the contract period.

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
ABSTRACT	iii
GLOSSARY	v
FOREWORD	vii
1. INTRODUCTION	1-1
2. METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING FSPT	2-1
2.1 Definition of Safe Aircraft	2-1
2.2 Mathematical Basis of FSPT	2-1
2.3 Sensitivity Assignments	2-2
3. MODEL DEVELOPMENT	3-1
3.1 Functional Analysis	3-1
3.2 Major-Function Sensitivity Assignment	3-2
3.2.1 Assignment Method	3-2
3.2.2 Link Dependency Assignment	3-5
3.2.3 Provisory Factors	3-5
3.2.4 Computer Processing	3-5
3.2.5 Model Maintenance	3-7
4. O-2 MODEL DEVELOPMENT	4-1
APPENDIX A: Historical Summary of FSPT	A-1
APPENDIX B: Formulation of Criticality-Assessment Technique	B-1
APPENDIX C: FSPT Documentation Methods	C-1
APPENDIX D: FSPT Documentation of O-2 Aircraft	D-1

ILLUSTRATIONS AND TABLES

<u>Figure</u>		<u>Page</u>
1-1	Example of Criticality Ranking Process	1-2
3-1	Activities and Data Inputs to Flight Safety Criticality Assessment . .	3-1
3-2	Hierarchical Structure of Aircraft Functions	3-3
3-3	Phases of Aircraft Mission	3-4

<u>Table</u>		
3-1	Provisory Factor Codes	3-6
4-1	O-2 System Documentation	4-2

1

INTRODUCTION

The Flight Safety Prediction Technique developed by ARINC Research Corporation provides for assessment of the impact on flight safety of the failure of specific items of equipment within an aircraft. In the FSPT, mathematical modeling procedures are applied for processing aircraft-equipment failure data to yield a quantified index ranking safety-related problems on the basis of their likelihood of occurrence and the resulting degradation in the aircraft's capability to fly.

The ranking factor is called "criticality", which in its simplest form is the product of the failure probability and flight-safety sensitivity of an equipment. (A more detailed definition appears in Section 2 and Appendix B.) The failure probability inputs are from basic failure-data sources, AFM 66-1 and 65-110. The sensitivity estimates are derived by the following process:

- a. Systematic analysis of aircraft functions to determine those essential to flight safety
- b. Identification of the hardware required to perform these functions
- c. Evaluation of the safety significance of the hardware in performing these essential aircraft functions.

The criticality values resulting from this approach provide a relative ranking of all malfunctions with respect to their safety significance. Figure 1-1 is a simplified example of how three equipment items would be ranked on the combined basis of their failure probability and safety sensitivity. This figure illustrates an example in which item A has the highest failure probability, but due to the low sensitivity value is ranked below item B in criticality.

The methodology has the ability to rank malfunction problems currently and continuously by their accident potential. This ranking, based on criticality assessment, can provide the basic parameters necessary for:

- a. Identifying equipment items whose failure history and application pose a threat to aircraft safety
- b. Quantifying the degree of threat associated with each equipment item
- c. Evaluating and tracking the effectiveness of modifications to the aircraft
- d. Assessing safety benefits versus the cost of proposed aircraft modifications, changes in maintenance or flight operations, or alternative aircraft designs.




Figure 1-1. Example of Criticality Ranking Process

In this report, Section 4 and Appendix D pertain specifically to the O-2 aircraft. The remainder of the document provides support information that will make the O-2 data, and the method by which the data were obtained, more meaningful to the general reader.

Section 2 presents an overview of the development and utilization of the Flight Safety Prediction Technique; Section 3 discusses the steps associated with generating a safety model for calculating the safety criticality of various equipments of an aircraft; and Section 4 describes how the safety model for the O-2 aircraft was developed. Appendix A summarizes the contractual history of the development of the FSPT; Appendix B discusses mathematical considerations underlying the technique; Appendix C discusses FSPT documentation methods; and Appendix D presents functional relationship diagrams and a listing of keypunch cards that comprise the safety model documentation for the O-2 aircraft.

2

METHODOLOGY UNDERLYING FSPT

This section discusses the basic definitions and mathematical concepts associated with the Flight Safety Prediction Technique.

2.1 DEFINITION OF SAFE AIRCRAFT

To develop a relative measure of aircraft safety degradation resulting from specific equipment malfunctions, it is first necessary to define a "safe" aircraft. For purposes of the FSPT assessments, an aircraft is assumed to be in a safe condition if it is operating within its prescribed performance limits. Conversely, an aircraft operating (or about to operate) outside these limits is considered to be unsafe - in a condition where property damage and personal injury may result.

The safety prediction methodology does not attempt to assess the extent of possible personal injury or aircraft damage resulting from an unsafe condition. Neither does the concept consider ejection capability, parachutes, life rafts, etc., which do not make an aircraft safer per se but provide for the survivability of the aircrew when the aircraft is unsafe. Collision is also excluded from consideration because of the complexity of the interrelationships between pilot, aircraft equipment, ground surveillance, and traffic density.

2.2 MATHEMATICAL BASIS OF FSPT

The probability of an accident caused by the failure of an element can be expressed as the probability of the element failing multiplied by the conditional probability that the failure of the element will cause an accident. Stated in equation form:

$$P(A, j) = P(j)P(A|j) \quad (1)$$

where

$P(A, j)$ = Probability of an accident due to failure of just the j^{th} element*

$P(j)$ = Probability that element j fails

$P(A|j)$ = Probability of an accident given that the j^{th} element fails.

This equation reflects the basic relationships addressed in the FSPT where:

- a. The criticality of the j^{th} element is an estimate of $P(A, j)$
- b. The sensitivity of the j^{th} element is an estimate of $P(A|j)$

*In this and subsequent discussions, unless otherwise stated, expressions such as "failure of the j^{th} element" should be interpreted to mean: failure of only the j^{th} element, assuming all other elements are not failed.

Because an element's effect on safety may depend on the mission phase (see Section 3.2.1), the above model can be expanded to:

$$P(A, j) = \sum_{k=1}^N P_{j,k} P(A|j, k) \quad (2)$$

where

N = Number of mission phases

$P_{j,k}$ = Probability that the j^{th} element is failed in the k^{th} phase

$P(A|j, k)$ = The j^{th} element's sensitivity in the k^{th} phase.

To identify the importance of discrete elements to aircraft safety, a flight profile consisting of nine distinct phases was defined. The phases are discussed in Section 3.2.1.

To utilize equation 2, it was necessary to develop a method for obtaining the values of $P(A|j, k)$, the probability that a malfunction in element j during mission phase k will result in an accident. This method in turn requires the estimation of two parameters: the probability of accident if a major function is not available during each mission phase, and the dependence of the major function on subfunctions and elements during each such phase*. Each function and equipment item thus derives its sensitivity value from its relationship to the major function(s) dependent upon it.

2.3 SENSITIVITY ASSIGNMENTS

A great deal of information is available on the causes of aircraft accidents, but little exists from which to make the sensitivity assignments $[P(A|j)]$. These assignments are therefore largely subjective, based on the analyst's knowledge of the system and any information he may have on previous accident history. The sensitivity assignments are reviewed (and revised as necessary) by an Air Force/contractor team working on a particular model to ensure that consistent criteria have been followed. The team review and negotiation of sensitivity assignments is the mechanism by which the value becomes sufficiently objective for use with the model. This negotiation considers all of those top level functions as a group and reassigns sensitivity values as necessary to assure that the most objective proportionality is attained for the particular aircraft model. The same major-function sensitivity values are used for major functions on all aircraft models where configuration and mission profiles permit.

The development of criticality rankings for the various elements (j 's) is dependent upon the ability to quantify the failure probability $[P(j)]$ and the element sensitivity $[P(A|j)]$ for each element. Since the intent of the concept is to provide a relative safety ranking of all malfunctions, it is not necessary to develop absolute

*For a more detailed discussion of the mathematics of the FSPT, see Appendix B.

values for $P(A|j)$. If the sensitivity values developed are correct relative to each other, a proper criticality ranking will be established. It is intended that criticality be an index proportional to $P(A, j)$ and therefore provide the same relative rank ordering of elements. The major reasons for proportionality, rather than equality, are:

- a. The FSPT does not account for the effect of extraordinary pilot intervention to prevent an accident in case of equipment malfunction.
- b. Criticality quantification was limited in its treatment of simultaneous occurrence of independent, primary failures.
- c. Operational and malfunction data yield only a proportional estimate of the required information.

While strict proportionality cannot be mathematically proven, it is believed that the criticality rankings provide reasonable relative measures of equipment problem potential.

3 MODEL DEVELOPMENT

Figure 3-1 summarizes the approach to the assessment of flight-safety criticality of aircraft equipment. The first contractor activity is the identification of all functions the aircraft is expected to perform and the determination of their inter-relationships. Next, each functional relationship is documented; and then sensitivity assignments are made at the major functional levels (below these levels, link dependency values are estimated; see discussion, Section 3.2.2). This process is carried out until each work unit code associated with a major function has been identified with respect to the function performed and dependencies have been estimated. Computer processing calculates the safety sensitivity for each work unit coded item, combines these values with the operation and failure data input by the Air Force, and produces the equipment criticality ranking.




Figure 3-1. Activities and Data Inputs to Flight Safety Criticality Assessment

The steps in this process are discussed in greater detail in the following sections.

3.1 FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

Functional analysis entails the systematic identification of the relationships of hardware to the functions performed by the aircraft and documented in the aircraft technical orders. Tabulated for each aircraft function are the equipments necessary for its performance as well as all outputs required for other systems. The complexity of the functional interdependencies of an aircraft requires the use of a systematic

accounting procedure, as discussed below, to assure that all relationships have been identified and that no functional paths have been overlooked.

Certain top-level functions (comprised of both "primary" and "major" functions) have been defined as applicable to all aircraft types, and serve as the starting point for a safety analysis. Figure 3-2 lists these top level functions with the primary function of Flight Control expanded to show its typical major functions. Below the major function level, differences in aircraft types result in function identification and structuring specifically suited to each aircraft. In Figure 3-2, for instance, the major function Roll Control is subdivided into Left Roll and Right Roll, and further into aileron and spoiler actuation subfunctions. This structure is that applicable to an F-4 aircraft, in which ailerons have an extremely limited upward travel and lift is primarily lost through spoiler operation. Finally, each item in the aircraft WUC ("-06") manual is identified with respect to the function it performs. *

Every function and every WUC included in the model receives an "alpha designator" unique to that aircraft model. Due to the large number of alpha designators required in a model, an indenturing system is utilized to prevent duplication. However, the location in the hierarchical structure and the number of characters in the alpha designators are often independent, since such correlation is not necessary for subsequent computer processing.

The functional relationships from the system diagram, and identification of the equipment necessary for each function, are next documented in an 80-column punch-card format (see Appendix C). The total functional diagram for the aircraft is then a compilation of the system diagrams, with one punchcard for each functional link.

With the aircraft functions completely documented, the functional paths by which a piece of equipment contributes to the operation of the aircraft can be identified by computer. Performing the path-identification/documentation task by computer proves to be not only useful but necessary - the human analyst could neither keep track of nor assign sensitivity values to all functional paths. The machine processing capability allows the analyst to consider only one functional link at a time. The ability to follow all of the functional interrelationships within the aircraft, which is necessary for meaningful assessment of safety, is then provided by the computer.

3.2 MAJOR-FUNCTION SENSITIVITY ASSIGNMENT

3.2.1 Assignment Method

As stated earlier, the sensitivity of a function or equipment item is an estimate of the probability that its failure will cause an accident. From functional analysis of the aircraft under consideration, major functions are identified and are assigned sensitivity values for each phase of the mission.

*Certain WUC items in the "-06" manual may not be included in the safety model, these items being either 1) eliminated by TCTOs; 2) purely structural items in the 11000 series; 3) necessary only for survivability or ejection; 4) of lower indenture than the LRU level, where computer data screening eliminates failure reports.




Figure 3-2. Hierarchical Structure of Aircraft Functions

The relative importance of primary functions, major functions, and functions is not necessarily constant throughout a flight. The failure, for example, of one engine of a multi-engine aircraft is far more critical on takeoff than it is during the rest of the flight, and is of relatively little importance during startup and taxi. To accommodate this variability of importance, the mission of an aircraft is divided into nine flight phases:

1. Startup and taxi
2. Takeoff
3. Ascend (climb-out)
4. Cruise, outbound
5. Intercept or tactical phase
6. Cruise, inbound
7. Descend
8. Land
9. Taxi and shutdown

These phases are illustrated in Figure 3-3.




Figure 3-3. Phases of Aircraft Mission

A sensitivity value is assigned for each of the phases, and represents the best estimate of the likelihood that the aircraft will enter a hazardous mode if the function is not present in that phase. The numerical values assigned are proportional rather than absolute, and range from 0.0 to 1.0. The keypunch card format limits this assignment to increments of 0.1. Increments smaller than 0.1, when required, were assigned by defining a quasi-function for insertion between the major function and its dependent primary function.

3.2.2 Link Dependency Assignment

"Link dependency" is defined as the probability that the loss of a function will result in the loss of a dependent function. (For a more detailed discussion of this term, see Appendix B.) The assignment of link dependency values requires knowledge of the operation of specific aircraft because it is concerned only with functional levels below the "major" category. At this lower level, no evaluation is made of the impact on flight safety of the loss of functions. Instead, the effect of the loss of one function on the performance of another function becomes the evaluation criterion. Like sensitivities, link dependency values are assigned in increments of 0.1. Additionally, the method of attenuation used in assigning sensitivity values can also be applied to link dependencies.

3.2.3 Provisory Factors

The sensitivity of major functions with respect to aircraft safety, and at the lower levels the link dependency between functions, can be dependent on external influences and aircraft operating conditions. To accommodate these external influences, a set of provisory factors has been identified. An example would be a windshield anti-ice system, which has a safety sensitivity close to 1.0 during landing under icing conditions but a negligible effect on a dry, warm day.

Under such circumstances, the procedure is to assign the "worst case" value (assuming the condition exists). During model exercise the likelihood that the condition exists can be "read-in", thereby allowing the sensitivity value to be assigned by the computer based on the likelihood of the condition and the probability that the higher level function will therefore be lost. Table 3-1 lists the standard provisory factors used in FSPT models.

3.2.4 Computer Processing

Documentation of a flight safety analysis by ARINC Research thus consists of functional diagrams, coded functional tabulations, a functional data processing card deck, and a machine-prepared printout of the card deck data. Under this contract, the documentation is then sent to San Antonio Air Logistics Center for review by MMER personnel and representatives of the Air Logistics Center responsible for the particular aircraft (if other than SA/ALC).

SA/ALC processes the functional data card deck utilizing a number of computerized operations. First, a functional deck edit is accomplished to identify certain format or logic errors that may exist. Next, a path identification/documentation run is made that traces all possible paths associated with each function and calculates the numerical sensitivities by flight phase down to the WUC level. Then, a path combination run is made taking into account the dependence of more than one major function on a particular WUC. Finally, failure information from the 66-1 data system and numerical factors for provisory conditions are input and a WUC criticality list by rank order is generated by the computer.

TABLE 3-1. PROVISORY FACTOR CODES

Code	Provisory Condition
A	Icing conditions
B	Adverse speed/altitude operations
C	Runway stopping distance/confined area (Helicopter)
D	Night operation
E	IFR conditions
F	Supersonic flight
G	Rain
H	Solo flight
I	Loss of function for which indication is provided
K	Normal system failed
T	Flame-out
X	Fire
Y	Cold weather
2	One of three available units is required
3	Two of three available units are required
4	One of four available units is required
5	Two of four available units are required
6	Three of four available units are required
8	Four of eight available units are required

An additional product generated by the computer is a two-part criticality trend analysis. Part I contains the criticality rankings and linear regression analysis by WUC for the previous 12 months. Part II contains plots of the criticalities and regression lines for the 25 WUCs top-ranked according to safety criticality.

3.2.5 Model Maintenance

Each time an aircraft type for which a safety model has been developed undergoes a modification, the effects of the changes on the model must be evaluated. Technical order and WUC revisions must be incorporated into the model. Removal of existing hardware, the installation of new hardware, or design improvements may change link dependencies and sensitivity assignments. The update procedure should follow the same general steps as outlined for the initial analysis effort.

Existing block diagrams and a printout of the functional card deck form the baseline for change identification. Functional relationships should be reviewed to determine the impact of changes on the documented safety analysis. Diagrams should be revised to reflect functional differences, WUC changes should be noted, and all differences listed on a flight-safety functional tabulation sheet. The functional deck printout can be used for manual indication of what the changes are and where they occur. New data cards are prepared and the functional deck updated by the removal of obsolete cards and the insertion of new cards. From this point on, the computer is again utilized to edit the functional deck, perform path identification/documentation, and calculate sensitivities for each WUC.

Block diagrams and other affected portions of the specific aircraft safety analysis report should be updated and revised pages issued that reflect these changes. Maintaining an accurate and updated model is important to obtaining an accurate assessment of the safety significance of hardware failures.

O-2 MODEL DEVELOPMENT

The FSPT model documented herein applies to the O-2A and O-2B aircraft. Model development on these aircraft was initiated in August 1974, and the completed documentation was submitted to SA/ALC for computer edit in January 1975.

The aircraft flight manual and maintenance technical orders provided the information on aircraft system operation. The model developed represents the O-2 aircraft configured to the latest time compliance technical orders (TCTOs) documented in the manuals supplied by SA/ALC. Table 4-1 lists the manuals and their revision status applicable to the developed model.

The O-2 safety model was developed by ARINC Research for all systems except the landing gear. The landing gear diagram and functional documentation cards were produced by MMER/SA/ALC, and interface documentation for the landing gear was a joint effort by SA/ALC and ARINC Research.

A single functional documentation deck having "O2" in columns 1 and 2 was used for the two versions of the O-2 aircraft. Cards having a blank in column 3 are common to both the O-2A and O-2B aircraft. When the common cards are combined with those having an "A" in column 3, the resulting deck documents the O-2A. Similarly, the common cards combined with the cards containing a "B" in column 3 document the O-2B.

Because of the vulnerability of the functional logic/sensitivity documentation to such errors as omission of links, duplication of cards, and keypunching, quality reviews were conducted at various critical points in the model development. In addition to keypunch verification, each card was checked against the functional link shown on the original rough draft and the final functional diagram and the diagrammed link was checked off. Missing or duplicated functional links were thus identified. Work unit codes used in the model were checked off against the WUC manual to assure completeness.

The quality reviews were first conducted by the organizations responsible for the subsystems prior to merging and computer verification of the respective aircraft decks by SA/ALC. Following the merging of the Air Force/ARINC Research decks and computer verification at SA/ALC, a second quality review was performed by representatives of ARINC Research and SA/ALC. Finally, the first criticality printout obtained from application of actual aircraft data was reviewed to identify any items whose sensitivity appeared to be unreasonable. In such cases the paths were traced manually and changes made if an erroneous relationship was found.

Appendix C presents the methods and standards used in documenting an FSPT aircraft model. Appendix D presents the FSPT documentation for the O-2 aircraft, which covers both the SA/ALC and ARINC Research portion of the model.

TABLE 4-1. O-2 SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION

Publication No.	Title	Revision/Date
1L-2A-1	Flight Manual	Basic, 1 Mar 1973
1L-2A-2	Maintenance	Change 9, 1 May 1971
1L-2A-6	Work Unit Code Manual	Change 3, 1 May 1974

APPENDIX A
HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF FSPT

HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF FSPT

In 1965, the desirability and practicability of quantifying the significance of specific equipment malfunctions relative to flight safety was explored in a feasibility study conducted by ARINC Research Corporation for the Air Force. The feasibility of a safety-quantification approach, which has subsequently become known as Flight Safety Prediction Technique (FSPT), was demonstrated; and the method was developed and refined in a series of studies, as follows:

<u>Study Phase</u>	<u>Subject/Date</u>	<u>Sponsor*/Publication No.</u>
I	Feasibility Study, September 1965 to June 1967 (Phase I)	Sacramento Air Materiel Area (SMNE), Contract AF09(603)62335, SM-67-2; publication 705-01-1-777
II-A	Technique Development, October 1967 to July 1968 (Phase II-A)	San Antonio Air Materiel Area (SANEW), Contract AF09(603)-67-A-0267-SA01; publication 734-01-1-895
II-B	Technique Development, July 1968 to July 1969 (Phase II-B)	San Antonio Air Materiel Area (SANEW), Contract F09(603)-68-A-0317-SA01; publication 754-01-1-985 (Revision 1)
	FSPT System Documentation for the F-4C and T-37 Aircraft, October 1970 to June 1971	San Antonio Air Materiel Area (MMER) Contract F41608-71-C-0576; publication 697-01-1-1118

In the Phase II-B study, the FSPT was applied to the F-106 aircraft. Concurrent with Phase II-B, the U. S. Naval Safety Center contracted ARINC Research to extend the methodology to produce a flight safety criticality model for the F-4J aircraft. The results of this effort are documented in ARINC Research Publication 753-01-3-982 (Revision 1).

In 1970, ARINC Research was contracted to develop suitable input data to permit the application of the technique to the T-37 and F-4C aircraft. These data were derived in the form of mathematical model functional documentation as input to the basic computer program developed and applied to the F-106.

In 1972, ARINC Research Corporation was awarded a contract, with the subsequent modifications in 1973 and 1974, to apply the Flight Safety Prediction Technique to 15 aircraft, working jointly with cognizant Air Logistics Centers. Aircraft to which the FSPT has been applied under this latter contract (F09603-72-A-1132-SA01) include:

- a. T-38
- b. F-111A and FB-111A

*The office symbols of Service Engineering at the Sacramento and San Antonio Air Materiel Areas are now SM/ALC/MME and SA/ALC/MME, respectively.

- c. A-7D
- d. F-4D, E; RF-4C
- e. C-141
- f. A-37
- g. O-2
- h. OV-10
- i. B-52G, H
- j. C-130E
- k. KC-135
- l. C-5A
- m. T-39
- n. F-15
- o. UH-1N Helicopter*

*Feasibility study of adaptation of FSPT to rotary-wing aircraft.

APPENDIX B
FORMULATION OF CRITICALITY-ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUE

FORMULATION OF CRITICALITY-ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUE

To implement the basic safety model defined in Section 2.2, it is necessary to develop a submodel for the probability that a malfunction in element j during mission phase k will result in an accident. This submodel in turn requires that we estimate two parameters: the probability of accident if a major function is not available during each mission phase, and the dependence of the major function on element j during each mission phase.

The first parameter is termed "functional sensitivity" and is estimated for each major function. The functional analysis performed in this task established for an aircraft the following hierarchal scheme:

Aircraft

Primary functions


Major functions

Function

Elements (Work Unit Codes)

A primary function would be one such as Flight Control. Major functions under Flight Control would include Pitch Control and Yaw Control.

The second parameter, "link dependency," is a vehicle for showing the influence of each functional-path element on the performance of a major function. For example, if the major function being considered is External Lighting, the following diagram illustrates the nature of functional sensitivity and link dependency values.



*Link dependencies


+Functional sensitivity

The 0.8 value means that failure of the Control function will result in loss of the Landing Light function 80% of the time. The 0.1 functional sensitivity value denotes that loss of external lighting will result in an accident 10% of the time. The values must be interpreted in a proportional sense, in that the actual accident probability is dependent upon external factors (see Section 3.2.3).

The remainder of this appendix discusses the procedures and model used to obtain element sensitivities; e.g., in the above example, the accident probability given that a Work Unit Code in the Control function malfunctions.


Three principal types of functional relationship--series, redundant, and parallel--were identified as representing the major forms to consider in modeling element sensitivity.

Series Relationship - A function having only one input. Schematically,




which indicates that outside of its own elements, the success of function B is only affected by the success of function A.

Functional Redundancy - A function having one or more backup functions that can provide the required inputs to successor functions. Schematically,



where A_1 and A_2 represent a functional redundancy in that either may provide the necessary input to B.


Parallel Functions - Two or more functions independent of each other in terms of functional success, but each of which may be required for a successor function. Schematically,



B will generally require both A_1 and A_2 ; but A_1 does not depend on A_2 , nor does A_2 depend on A_1 .

In some cases the distinction between functional redundancy and parallel paths is very slight, and may depend on mission phase. For example the four engines of a plane can be considered to be a redundant configuration providing inputs to the primary propulsion function during cruising, but would generally be considered to be parallel functions during takeoffs requiring full power.

In general, given a schematic relationship of the form,




we can say that A and B are in a functionally redundant configuration if the success probability of C is the same if 1) A and B are successful, 2) A only is successful, or 3) B only is successful. If, for example, C is more likely to be successful if both A and B are successful, rather than A or B alone, then the relationship is one of parallel paths.

It is noted that the model will also account for element redundancy and parallel elements through inputs such as $P(\bar{A}|i_a)$, representing the probability that the Ath function fails given that the i_a^{th} element in A has failed. If i_a is a parallel element, the probability would depend on mission requirements and other parallel-element states.


Link dependency is the conditional probability of a functional failure, given the failure of immediate predecessor functions. The link dependencies applicable to the three basic designs defined above are shown below.

Series Relationship




Link dependency = $P(\bar{B}|\bar{A})$ = probability that B fails given that A fails.

Functional Redundancy




equivalent to



where $\bar{B} = \bar{B}_1 \bar{B}_2$


Parallel Functions



We shall generally assume that the dependencies of B_1 with respect to A , and of B_2 with respect to A , are independent of each other, so that

$$P(\bar{B}_1 \bar{B}_2 | \bar{A}) = P(\bar{B}_1 | \bar{A}) P(\bar{B}_2 | \bar{A})$$

We then can consider three link dependencies from A to B as follows:



noting that

$$P(\bar{B}_1|\bar{A}) = P(\bar{B}_1 B_2|\bar{A}) + P(\bar{B}_1 \bar{B}_2|\bar{A})$$

$$P(\bar{B}_2|\bar{A}) = P(B_1 \bar{B}_2|\bar{A}) + P(\bar{B}_1 \bar{B}_2|\bar{A})$$

Models are shown below for determining the sensitivity of elements within a function for each of the three basic designs. The following basic assumptions apply:

- a. Except for cases where an element has a redundant or parallel counterpart or is located in a function with a redundant or parallel function, only the element under consideration shall be assumed to have failed initially. Thus the expression $P(A|i_a)$, representing the accident probability given failure of the i th Work Unit Code element, is based on the assumption that no other element has failed unless element i is in some redundant or parallel configuration. For cases in which there are redundant or parallel counterparts, failures of such counterpart elements or functions are considered in accordance with their occurrence probabilities.
- b. The success of all immediate predecessors ensures the success of a function, provided that the function experiences no element failures. Thus for the series function relationship




we assume

$$P(\bar{B}|A) = 0,$$

provided B experiences no element failures. If an element in function A is under consideration, the latter provision is always true by assumption "a."


The element sensitivity models are:

Series Relationship



$$P(A|i_a) = P(\bar{A}|i_a)P(\bar{B}|\bar{A})P(\bar{C}|\bar{B})P(A|\bar{C})$$


Functional Redundancy



$$P(A|i_a) = P(\bar{A}|i_a)P(\bar{B}|\bar{A})P(\bar{C}|\bar{B})P(A|\bar{C})$$

$$P(A|i_{b1}) = P(\bar{B}_1|i_{b1})P(\bar{B}_2)P(\bar{C}|\bar{B})P(A|\bar{C})$$


Parallel Functions



$$P(A|i_a) = P(\bar{A}|i_a) \{ P(\bar{B}C|\bar{A})P(\bar{D}|\bar{B}C) + P(B\bar{C}|\bar{A})P(\bar{D}|B\bar{C}) \\ + P(\bar{B}\bar{C}|\bar{A})P(\bar{D}|\bar{B}\bar{C}) \} P(A|\bar{D})$$

$$P(A|i_b) = P(\bar{B}|i_b) \{ P(\bar{C}|i_b)P(\bar{D}|\bar{B}\bar{C}) + P(C|i_b)P(\bar{D}|B\bar{C}) \} P(A|\bar{D})$$

A case not explicitly included in the above three basic functional relationships is one for which a function is in two paths, e.g.,



then

$$P(A|i_a) = P(\bar{C}|i_a)P(B|i_a)P(A|\bar{C}B) + P(C|i_a)P(\bar{B}|i_a)P(A|C\bar{B}) \\ + P(\bar{C}|i_a)P(\bar{B}|i_a)\{1 - P(A|\bar{C})P(A|\bar{B})\}$$

where it is assumed that the effects of loss of the major functions in accident occurrence are independent of each other.

Use of Numerical Provisory Factors for Partially Redundant Systems

The numerical provisory factors (see Table 3-1) are used where more than two identical functions are involved in a redundancy. For example, aircraft with more than two engines often have identical and independent systems for hydraulic pressurization, and for electrical power generation, one driven by each engine. If the aircraft can be operated safely with one or more of such systems in a failed state, one of the numeric codes is utilized in assigning link dependency values. Consider, for example, the following:

If N identical and independent units* are available and at least M are required for safe operation, where $0 < M < N$, then the provisory factor of a given unit, say U_j , is the probability that the failure of U_j will cause the aircraft to enter an unsafe state. This is the probability that exactly $M-1$ of the remaining $N-1$ units will be in an unfailed state. This probability can be calculated by the formula for the binomial distribution, and is given by

$$P(U_j) = \binom{N-1}{M-1} p^{(M-1)} q^{(N-M)}$$

where $P(U_j)$ = probability that failure of the j^{th} unit will cause the aircraft to enter an unsafe state, and

M = Number of units required

N = Number of units available

p = Probability that a single unit will be in an unfailed state

q = Probability that a single unit will be in a failed state or $(1-p)$

*Units may be either elements, element assemblies, or functions.

Assignment of link dependencies to N identical and independent units of which only M are required proceeds as follows. The value assigned to each unit is the dependency of the higher level function on receiving an output from M of the units (usually 1.0). The provisory factor is the appropriate numeric code. In the evaluation of the path sensitivity, the computer is programmed to select the binomial formula that corresponds to the provisory factor listed.

APPENDIX C
FSPT DOCUMENTATION METHODS

FSPT DOCUMENTATION METHODS

Because of the extreme complexity of aircraft, it is necessary to develop a computerized method to identify and document all possible paths associated with each function as well as to determine the safety sensitivity associated with each path. A computer routine has been devised that takes the data from the functional card deck and traces and documents all paths. For each WUC, it also computes the flight-phase sensitivities for each path in which the WUC is present. The resulting computer printout provides a combined functional path sensitivity.

C.1 ALPHA CODING

As each system of the aircraft is functionally diagrammed, the functional blocks are assigned an "alpha code". This code aids the analyst in the bookkeeping tasks of functional diagramming and provides the computer with an identification of the elements to be processed. For standardization among aircraft, nine top-level functions have been defined and each has been assigned an initial or first-alpha designator. Each block in the functional diagram carries the same initial alpha as the top level function. Subsequent letters added to the initial alpha uniquely identify each block.

The only restrictions placed on the assignment of alpha codes are that:

- a. All characters in a code must be a letter of the alphabet, and
- b. The maximum number of characters in one code is seven.

C.2 ALPHA CODING AND COMPUTER PROGRAM COMPATIBILITY

Additional rules for alpha coding required to obtain the desired results from computer processing include:

- a. When a WUC item operates in the same mode to perform more than one function, the same alpha code is used in each application.
- b. When a WUC item operates in a different mode to perform each of more than one function, a different alpha designator is assigned for each operating mode.

C.3 FUNCTIONAL TABULATION

The "Flight Safety Functional Tabulation" sheet is used to code the safety model for keypunching. The sheets are coded as follows (refer to Figure C-1) for an example).

- a. Columns 1 through 3. Used to identify the aircraft represented by the model. For certain aircraft modeled under this contract more than one model - designation series MDS - was included. For instance, a single functional deck was created for four MDSs of the F-4 aircraft. Cards with "F4**ø**"* in columns 1-3 were common to all aircraft. For example,

***ø** = blank

when these cards are combined with those carrying "F4E" in columns 1-3, then it produces an F-4E FSPT model deck.

- b. Columns 4 through 31. Contain the title of the function or the WUC item.
- c. Columns 32 through 36. Contain the left-justified WUC number.
- d. Columns 37 and 38. Blank
- e. Columns 39 through 46. Contain the assigned alpha designator for the function and/or the WUC. Column 39 contains either an L or an R, or is blank. The L and R designate left and right for those instances when the function and/or WUC pertains to the left or right side of the aircraft.
- f. Columns 47 and 48. Blank.
- g. Columns 49 through 55. Normally left blank, but are used after a deck is operational to substitute the data on a card for that stored in the computer by punching the line record number in this field.
- h. Columns 56 through 63. Identify the dependent functions for either the function or specific WUCs being coded. Column 56 may contain L, R or blank for the same purpose as that of column 39.
- i. Column 64. Contains the alphanumeric code of the "provisory factor" applicable to the link value assigned.
- j. Columns 65 through 69. Contain the alpha designator of a function that is an alternate for the function being coded. (Column 65 is used for "L" or "R" as in Column 39.) The presence of the "alternate alpha" flags the importance of the link dependency as being affected by the success probability of the alternate function.
- k. Column 70. Contains the work unit code dependency value ($1 = 0.10$; $2 = 0.20$; $A = 1.0$). This value is applicable to all flight phases.
- l. Column 71. Contains special instructions to the computer through the use of letters F, S, or being blank. Cards with an "S" or "blank" in column 71 are used in sensitivity computations. Cards with an "F" document a functional relationships which, although present in the system, would produce an erroneous sensitivity value when combined with other nonindependent paths (having the same function in common at some higher level). The "F" prevents the computer from including the link in the sensitivity calculations.
- m. Columns 72 through 80. Contain functional dependencies for each of nine flight phases as described in Section 3.2.1 of the text. Coding is the same as for column 70.

C.4 DIAGRAM CONSTRUCTION

The diagrams produced under the contract document the functional inter-relationship of the aircraft systems considered in the model. In the interest of extending the useful life of the diagrams, WUC items are not shown, thereby eliminating the necessity of updating the diagrams with each (and sometimes frequent) change to the WUC manual.

As discussed earlier in this report, the diagrams represent the hierarchal structure of the paths from which the sensitivity values are derived. The diagrams, although consistent with the system schematic and reliability block diagrams, are not equivalent due to this hierarchal method of documentation. In the actual system, signals and/or fluids pass from one component to the next and are thus documented in schematics; conversely, the hierarchal approach only identifies the components that must operate to achieve a given function, independent of the direction and/or sequence of signal flow. This approach directly addresses the system impact of a component failure without the necessity of identifying the intrasystem secondary failures. Each line connecting functions on the diagram is documented by a punchcard, with the lower function providing the "alpha designator" and the higher function's alpha designator indicator as the "dependent function". *

*The card deck also documents functional relationships not shown on the diagram; the work unit codes (mentioned earlier) and the "S" cards discussed in paragraph C.3.1.

APPENDIX D
FSPT DOCUMENTATION OF O-2 AIRCRAFT

FSPT DOCUMENTATION OF O-2 AIRCRAFT

This appendix contains the functional relationship diagrams and a listing of the keypunch cards that comprise the FSPT safety model documentation for the O-2A and O-2B aircraft.

D.1 DIAGRAMS


The diagrams illustrating the functional relationships considered in the O-2 safety model are presented on pages D-5 through D-16, and are listed below:


<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
Propulsion, Diagram B-1	D-5
Propulsion, Diagram B-2	D-6
Comm/Nav/Ident, Diagram C-1	D-7
Comm/Nav/Ident, Diagram C-2	D-8
Information & Display, Diagram D-1	D-9
Environmental Control, Diagram E-1	D-10
Flight Control, Diagram F-1	D-11
Ground Control, Diagram G-1	D-12
Mission Support, Diagram M-1	D-13
Landing Gear, Diagram N-1	D-14
Utilities, Diagram U-1	D-15
Utilities, Diagram U-2	D-16

D.2 CARD LISTING


Pages D-17 through D-44 are a reproduction of the punchcard listing. The listing is alphabetical by "alpha designator", and the format is that of the 80-column punchcard itself as described in Appendix C. At the top of each page the card columns are printed vertically; for example, column 34 is printed "34"

The first two columns of the punchcard are coded "O2". If the third column is blank, the card is common to both versions of the aircraft. Cards peculiar to one version of the aircraft carry a designator in column 3 for the aircraft - "A" for the O-2A and "B" for the O-2B.







TITLE: PROPULSION		
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM
B-2A, 3	JAN '76	B-2




TITLE: COMM/NAV/IDENT		
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM
O-2A, B	JAN '76	C-1




TITLE: COMM/NAV/IDENT		
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM
O-2A, B	JAN '76	C-2







TITLE: ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL			
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM	
O-2A, B	JAN 75	E-1	




TITLE: FLIGHT CONTROL		
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM
O-2A,B	JAN '76	F-1




TITLE: GROUND CONTROL		
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM
O-2A, B	JAN '76	G-1




TITLE: MISSION SUPPORT			
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM	
O-2A, B	JAN '76	M-1	



TITLE: LANDING GEAR			
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM	
O-2A, B	JAN '76	N-1	





TITLE: UTILITIES		
AIRCRAFT	DATE	DIAGRAM
O-2B	JAN '76	U-2

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PROGRAMS JIR1 DATE = 01/12/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

00000000111111112222222233333333334444444444555555555566666666667777777777H
 1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
 00000000 J100 0-2 02 02A 02A02B

02	PROPULSION	B			AAAAA
02	FRONT ENGINE PROPULSION	LBA	B		020000000
02	FRONT ENGINE PROPULSION	LBA	R	K HX	AAAAA
02	FRONT ENGINE PROPULSION	LBA	BX		5AAAAA
02	REAR ENGINE PROPULSION	RBA	R		030000000
02	REAR ENGINE PROPULSION	RBA	R	K HX	AAAAA
02	ENGINE MOUNTS #4 EAC	21LCO LBA	LBA		A
02	ENGINE MOUNTS #4 EAC	21LCO RBA	RBA		A
02	DISCUTS #8 EAC	21LAA LBA	LBA		0
02	DISCUTS #8 EAC	21LAA RBA	RBA		0
02	MOUNT ASSY- REAR	11AM1 RBA	RBA		5
02	PROP THRUST	LBA	LBA		AAAAA
02	PROP THRUST	RBA	RBA		AAAAA
02	PROP ASSY FRONT	32AA0 LBA	LBA		2
02	PROP ASSY REAR	32AB0 RBA	RBA		2
02	BLADE #2 EAC	32AAA LBA	LBA		2
02	BLADE	32ABA RBA	RBA		2
02	BALANCE WEIGHT	32AAB LBA	LBA		5
02	BALANCE WEIGHT	32ABR RBA	RBA		5
02	HUB ASSY	32AAC LBA	LBA		2
02	HUB ASSY	32ARC RBA	RBA		2
02	SPINNER ASSY	32AAF LBA	LBA		0
02	SPINNER ASSY	32ABF RBA	RBA		0
02	PROP CONTROL	LBA	LBA		AAAAA
02	PROP CONTROL	RBA	RBA		AAAAA
02	CYL ASSY FEATHER	32BAA LBA	LBA		A
02	CYL ASSY FEATHER	32BA0 RBA	RBA		A
02	PIN,CYL LOCATING	32BAB LBA	LBA		A
02	PIN,CYL LOCATING	32BAR RBA	RBA		A
02	LATCH ASSY	32BAE LBA	LBA		5
02	LATCH ASSY	32BAF RBA	RBA		5
02	COUNTERWEIGHT	32BAF LBA	LBA		A
02	COUNTERWEIGHT	32BAF RBA	RBA		A
02	LEVER ASSY	32BAG LBA	LBA		2
02	LEVER ASSY	32BAG RBA	RBA		2
02	TELEX PUSH-PULL	32BAH LBA	LBA		2
02	TELEX PUSH-PULL	32BAH RBA	RBA		2
02	GOVERNOR	32BAJ LBA	LBA		A
02	GOVERNOR	32BAJ RBA	RBA		A
02	PUSH-ROD	32BAK LBA	LBA		5
02	PUSH-ROD	32BAK RBA	RBA		5
02	SPEEDER SPRING	32BAL LBA	LBA		5
02	SPEEDER SPRING	32BAL RBA	RBA		5
02	GEAR,PUMP DRIVE	32BAM LBA	LBA		A
02	GEAR,PUMP DRIVE	32BAM RBA	RBA		A
02	LIFT ROD	32BAP LBA	LBA		2
02	LIFT ROD	32BAP RBA	RBA		2
02	CONTROLLEX	32BAR LBA	LBA		2
02	CONTROLLEX	32BAR RBA	RBA		2

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FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

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0000000001111111112222222223333333334444444445555555556666666667777777778
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
02 PITCH CONTROL LRD LBC AAAAAAAAAA
02 PITCH CONTROL RRD RHC AAAAAAAAAA
02 STOP,FEATHERING 32BAC LBD A 0
02 STOP,FEATHERING 32BAC RBD A 0
02 PLATE,LO PITCH STOP 32PAD LBDH A 0
02 PLATE,LO PITCH STOP 32PAD RBDH A 0
02 VALVE RELIEF 32BAN LBD C 8
02 VALVE RELIEF 32BAN RBD A 8
02 RPM INDICATION LBD KLBPX 11111111
02 RPM INDICATION RBD KRBPX 11111111
02 TACH INDICATOR 21RA1 LBDD A 8
02 TACH INDICATOR 21RA1 RBD A 8
02 RPM DETECTION LBDE A AAAAAAAAAA
02 RPM DETECTION LBDE UNJ A AAAAAAAAAA
02 RPM DETECTION RDE RBD A AAAAAAAAAA
02 TACH GENERATOR 21RAB LBDE A
02 TACH GENERATOR 21RAB RBD A
02 FLEX SHAFT 21RAC LBDE A
02 FLEX SHAFT 21RAC RBD A
02 REDUCTION DRIVE 21RAD LBDE A
02 REDUCTION DRIVE 21RAD RBD A
02 DRIVE ADAPTER 21RAE LBDE A
02 DRIVE ADAPTER 21RAE RBD A
02 UNFEATHER LRE T A AAAAAAAAAA
02 UNFEATHER RBE T A AAAAAAAAAA
02 ACCUMULATOR 32CAA LBE A
02 ACCUMULATOR 32CAA RBE A
02 UNFEATHER VALVE 32CAB LBE A
02 UNFEATHER VALVE 32CAB RBE A
02 HOSE 32CAC LBE A
02 HOSE 32CAC RBE A
02 POWER TRANSMISSION LBF LBB A AAAAAAAAAA
02 POWER TRANSMISSION LBF LRG F AAAAAAAAAA
02 POWER TRANSMISSION LBF LUDD F AAAAAAAAAA
02 POWER TRANSMISSION RBF RBB A AAAAAAAAAA
02 POWER TRANSMISSION RBF RRG F AAAAAAAAAA
02 POWER TRANSMISSION RBF RUDD F AAAAAAAAAA
02 CRANKCASE ASSY 21ACD LRF 1
02 CRANKCASE ASSY 21ACD RRF 1
02 HOUSING 21AAA LRF 1
02 HOUSING 21AAA RRF 1
02 BREATHER 21AAB LBFC A 0
02 BREATHER 21AAB RBF A 0
02 OIL SEAL 21BAR LBFD A 1
02 OIL SEAL 21BAR RBF A 1
02 CRANKSHAFT ASSY 21BAE LBFE A
02 CRANKSHAFT ASSY 21BAE RFE A
02 CONNECTING ROD %6 EAC 21BAF LBFF A 8
02 CONNECTING ROD %6 EAC 21BAF RBF A 8
02 CAMSHAFT AND GEAR 21BAK LBFG A

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1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
02 CAMSHAFT AND GEAR 21PAK RBFG RBF A
02 FRONT ACCESSORY DRIVE LRG LBKA AAAAAAAAAA
02B FRONT ACCESSORY DRIVE LRG LOS AAAAAAAAAA
02 ACCESSORY DRIVE LRG NJ AAAAAAAAAA
02 REAR ACCESSORY DRIVE RBG RBKA AAAAAAAAAA
02B REAR ACCESSORY DRIVE RBG RDS AAAAAAAAAA
02 ADAPTER-STARTER 21EAA LBGA LRG A
02 ADAPTER-STARTER 21EAA RBGA RBG A
02 ADAPTER-START/ACC DRIVE 21EAB LBGH LRG A
02 ADAPTER-START/ACC DRIVE 21EAB RBGB RBG A
02 CRANKCASE COVER ASSY 21EC0 LBGC LRG 0
02 CRANKCASE COVER ASSY 21EC0 RBGC RBG 0
02 COMBUSTION LBH LBF AAAAAAAAAA
02 COMBUSTION LBH LBHX FAAAAAAAAA
02 COMBUSTION RBH RBF AAAAAAAAAA
02 COMBUSTION RBH RBHX FAAAAAAAAA
02 CYLINDER ASSY #6 EAC 21CC0 LBHA LBH 1
02 CYLINDER ASSY #6 EAC 21CC0 RBHA RBH 1
02 VALVE,INTAKE #6 EAC 21CAC LBHB LBH 2
02 VALVE,INTAKE #6 EAC 21CAC RBHB RBH 2
02 EXHAUST VALVE #6 EAC 21CAD LBHC LBH 2
02 EXHAUST VALVE #6 EAC 21CAD RBHC RBH 2
02 ARM-ROCKER # 12 EAC 21CAK LBHD LBH 1
02 ARM-ROCKER # 12 EAC 21CAK RBHD RBH 1
02 SHAFT-ROCKER #6EAC 21CAL LBHE LBH 1
02 SHAFT-ROCKER #6EAC 21CAL RBHE RBH 1
02 LIFTER-HYD #12 EAC 21CAN LBHF LBH 1
02 LIFTER-HYD #12 EAC 21CAN RBHF RBH 1
02 ROD-PUSH #12 EAC 21CAP LBHG LBH 1
02 ROD-PUSH #12 EAC 21CAP RBHG RBH 1
02 PISTON ASSY #6 EAC 21P00 LBHH LBH 2
02 PISTON ASSY #6 EAC 21P00 RBHH RBH 2
02 RING 21DAA LBHJ LBH 1
02 RING 21DAA RBHJ RBH 1
02 PIN #6 EAC 21DAB LBHK LBH 2
02 PIN #6 EAC 21DAB RBHK RBH 2
02 CHT INDICATION LBHX LBN 111111111
02 CHT INDICATION RBHX RBN 111111111
02A GAGE,COMBINATION 21PC1 LBHXA LBHX A
02A GAGE,COMBINATION 21RC1 RBHXA RBHX A
02A BULB,CHT 21RCC LBHXB LBHX A
02A BULB,CHT 21RCC RBHXB RBHX A
02B GAGE/PROBE ASSY 21PE1 LBHXC LBHX A
02B GAGE/PROBE ASSY 21RE1 RBHXC RBHX A
02 LUBRICATION LBJ LRC FAAAAAAAAA
02 LUBRICATION LBJ LBF 019999910
02 LUBRICATION RBJ RRC FAAAAAAAAA
02 LUBRICATION RBJ RRF 019999910
02 OIL SUPPLY/DIST LBJA LBJ AAAAAAAAAA
02 OIL SUPPLY/DIST RBJA RBJ AAAAAAAAAA

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FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

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02	SUMP ASSY	21K00	LBJAA	LBJA	3	
02	SUMP ASSY	21K00	RHJAA	RBJA	3	
02	PLUG	21KAA	LBJAB	LBJA	1	
02	PLUG	21KAA	RBJAB	RBJA	1	
02	SCREENS	21HAA	LBJAC	LBJA	0	
02	SCREENS	21HAA	RBJAC	RBJA	0	
02	PRESSURIZATION		LBJB	LBJ		AAAAAAAAAA
02	PRESSURIZATION		LBJB	LBJBX		FAAAAAAAAAA
02	PRESSURIZATION		RBJB	RBJ		AAAAAAAAAA
02	PRESSURIZATION		RBJB	LBJBX		FAAAAAAAAAA
02	COVER OIL PUMP GEAR	21EAC	LBJBA	LBJB	0	
02	COVER OIL PUMP GEAR	21EAC	RBJBA	RBJB	0	
02	GEAR,OIL PUMP DRIVE	21HAC	LBJBH	LBJB	8	
02	GEAR,OIL PUMP DRIVE	21HAC	RBJBH	RBJB	8	
02	PUMP	21HAD	LBJHC	LBJB	8	
02	PUMP	21HAD	RBJHC	RBJB	8	
02	COVER OIL PUMP DRIVE	21HAE	LBJHD	LBJB	0	
02	COVER OIL PUMP DRIVE	21HAE	RBJHD	RBJB	0	
02	VALVE-PRESSURE RELIEF	21HAF	LBJBF	LBJB	3	
02	VALVE-PRESSURE RELIEF	21HAF	RBJHE	RBJB	3	
02	OIL PRESS INDICATION		LBJBX	LBPG		ILBJB 44444444
02	OIL PRESS INDICATION		RBJBX	RBPB		IRBJB 44444444
02A	GAGE COMBINATION	21RC1	LBJBXA	LBJBX	A	
02A	GAGE COMBINATION	21RC1	RBJBXA	RBJBX	A	
02H	GAGE,OIL PRESS	21RF1	LBJBXB	LBJBX	A	
02H	GAGE,OIL PRESS	21RF1	RBJBXB	RBJBX	A	
02A	CKT BKR COMBO GAGE	42FAB	LBJBXC	LBHX	A	
02A	CKT BKR COMBO GAGE	42FAB	LBJBXC	LBJX	A	
02A	CKT BKR COMBO GAGE	42FAB	RBJBXC	RBMX	A	
02A	CKT BKR COMBO GAGE	42FAB	RBJBXC	RBJX	A	
02	OIL TEMP CONTROL		LBJC	LBJ		008888800
02	OIL TEMP CONTROL		LBJC	LBJX		FAAAAAAAAAA
02	OIL TEMP CONTROL		RBJC	RBJ		008888800
02	OIL TEMP CONTROL		RBJC	RBJX		FAAAAAAAAAA
02	COOLER	21HAB	LBJCA	LBJC	5	
02	COOLER	21HAB	RBJCA	RBJC	5	
02	VALVE-VERNATHERM	21HAG	LBJCB	LBJC	5	
02	VALVE-VERNATHERM	21HAG	RBJCB	RBJC	5	
02	OIL TEMP INDICATION		LBJX	LBPG		ILBJC 33333333
02	OIL TEMP INDICATION		RBJX	RBPB		IRBJC 33333333
02A	GAGE,COMBINATION	21RC1	LBJXA	LBJX	A	
02A	GAGE,COMBINATION	21RC1	RBJXA	RBJX	A	
02A	BULB OIL TEMP	21RCB	LBJXB	LBJX	A	
02A	BULB OIL TEMP	21RCB	RBJXB	RBJX	A	
02H	GAGE/PROBE ASSY	21PD1	LBJXC	LBJX	A	
02H	GAGE/PROBE ASSY	21PD1	RBJXC	RBJX	A	
02	ENGINE START		LBK	LBH		T AAAAAAAAAA
02	ENGINE START		RBK	RBH		T AAAAAAAAAA
02	STARTER ACTION		LBKA	LKK		11111111
02	STARTER ACTION		RBKA	RKK		11111111

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02	STARTER	21SAA	LBKAA	LRKA	A
02	STARTER	21SAA	RBKAA	RBKA	A
02	CONTRACTOR	21SAC	LBKAB	LRKA	A
02	CONTRACTOR	21SAC	RBKAB	RBKA	A
024	ENGINE STARTER BUTTON	9921A	LBKAC	LBKA	A
024	ENGINE STARTER BUTTON	9921A	RBKAC	RBKA	A
028	MAGNETO/STARTER SWITCH	9921B	LBKAD	LRKA	A
028	MAGNETO/STARTER SWITCH	9921B	RBKAD	RBKA	A
026	CKT BKR INST CLUSTER	42FAB	LBKAE	LBHX	A
028	CKT BKR INST CLUSTER	42FAB	LBKAE	LBHX	A
02	CKT BKR START CONTROL	42FAB	LBKAF	LRKA	A
026	CKT BKR INST CLUSTER	42FAB	RBKAE	RBHX	A
026	CKT BKR INST CLUSTER	42FAB	RBKAE	RBHX	A
02	CKT BKR START CONTROL	42FAB	RBKAE	RBKA	A
02	CKT BKR	42FAB	RBKAE	DU	A
02	DUAL IGNITION		LRL	LBH	AAAAAAAAA
02	DUAL IGNITION		RBL	RBH	AAAAAAAAA
02	LEFT IGNITION		LRLA	LRL	KL3LB AAAAAAAAAA
02	LEFT IGNITION		RRLA	RRL	KR3LB AAAAAAAAAA
02	MAGNETO	21FAA	LBLAA	LBLA	A
02	MAGNETO	21FAA	RBLAA	RBLA	A
02	SPARKPLUGS #6 EAC	21FAC	LBLAB	LBLA	1
02	SPARKPLUGS #6 EAC	21FAC	RBLAB	RBLA	1
02	HARNESS	21FAB	LBLAC	LBLA	2
02	HARNESS	21FAB	RBLAC	RBLA	2
02	FILTER	21FAF	LBLAD	LHLA	2
02	FILTER	21FAF	RBLAD	RBLA	2
02	MAGNETO SWITCH	9921B	LBLAE	LHLA	5
02	MAGNETO SWITCH	9921B	RBLAE	RBLA	5
02	RIGHT IGNITION		LRLB	LRL	KLRLA AAAAAAAAAA
02	RIGHT IGNITION		RRLB	RRL	KRRLA AAAAAAAAAA
02	MAGNETO	21FAA	LBLBA	LHLB	A
02	MAGNETO	21FAA	RBLBA	RHLB	A
02	SPARK PLUGS #6 EAC	21FAC	LBLBB	LHLB	1
02	SPARK PLUGS #6 EAC	21FAC	RBLBB	RHLB	1
02	HARNESS	21FAB	LBLBC	LHLB	2
02	HARNESS	21FAB	RBLBC	RHLB	2
02	FILTER	21FAF	LBLBD	LHLB	2
02	FILTER	21FAF	RBLBD	RHLB	2
02	MAGNETO SWITCH	9921B	LBLBF	LHLB	5
02	MAGNETO SWITCH	9921B	RBLBF	RHLB	5
02	EXHAUST		LBM	LBM	AAAAAAAAA
02	EXHAUST		LBM	LBMX	FAAAAAAAAAA
02	EXHAUST		RBM	RBM	AAAAAAAAA
02	EXHAUST		RBM	RBMX	FAAAAAAAAAA
02	RISER FRONT #6 EAC	21NAA	LBMA	LBM	1
02	RISER FRONT #6 EAC	21NAA	RBMA	RBM	1
02	MUFFLER FRONT #2 EAC	21NAD	LBMB	LBM	1
02	MUFFLER FRONT #2 EAC	21NAD	RBMB	RBM	1
02	SHROUD ASSY FRONT #2 EAC	21NAE	LBMC	LBM	0

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FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

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12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
02 SHROUD ASSY FRONT #2 EAC 21NAE RBMC RBM 0
02 TAIL PIPE FRONT #2 EAC 21NAF LBMD LBM 1
02 TAIL PIPE FRONT #2 EAC 21NAF RBMD RBM 1
02 MOUNT SHOCK FRONT #2 EAC 21NAH LBME LBM 1
02 MOUNT SHOCK FRONT #2 EAC 21NAH RBME RBM 1
02 COLLECTOR/BALL ASSY FRONT 21NAL LBMF LBM 1
02 COLLECTOR/BALL ASSY FRONT 21NAL RBMF RBM 1
02 RISER #6 EAC REAR 21NBA LBMG LBM 1
02 RISER #6 EAC REAR 21NBA RBMG RBM 1
02 MUFFLER REAR 21NBD LBMH LBM 1
02 MUFFLER REAR 21NBD RBMH RBM 1
02 COLLECTOR/SOCKET ASSY REAR 21NRE LBMJ LBM 1
02 COLLECTOR/SOCKET ASSY REAR 21NRE RBMJ RBM 1
02 ELBOW/SOCKET ASSY REAR 21NHF LBMK LBM 1
02 ELBOW/SOCKET ASSY REAR 21NHF RBMK RBM 1
02 EGT INDICATION LBMX LBPF 000000000
02 EGT INDICATION RBMX RBPF 000000000
02 EGT INDICATOR 21FJ1 LBMXA LBMX A
02 EGT INDICATOR 21FJ1 RBMXA RBMX A
02 EGT PROBE 21FJA LBMXB LBMX A
02 EGT PROBE 21FJA RBMXB RBMX A
02 WIRING 21RJH LBMXC LBMX 8
02 WIRING 21RJH RBMXC RBMX 8
02 ENGINE COULING LBN LBH 044111110
02 ENGINE COULING RBN RBH 044111110
02 COWL FLAPS #2 EAC 21PAA LBNA LBN 1
02 COWL FLAPS #2 EAC 21PAA RBNA RBN 1
02 SWITCH CONTROL 21PAC LBNC LBN A
02 SWITCH CONTROL 21PAC RBNC RBN A
02 TORQUE TUBE 21PAE LBNC LBN A
02 TORQUE TUBE 21PAE RBNC RBN A
02 MOTOR 21PAF LBND LBN A
02 MOTOR 21PAF RBND RBN A
02 CONTROL RODS #2 EAC 21PAG LBNE LBN 5
02 CONTROL RODS #2 EAC 21PAG RBNE RBN 5
02 SWITCH, LIMIT 21PAJ LBNE LBN 5
02 SWITCH, LIMIT 21PAJ RBNE RBN 5
02 AIRSCOOP ASSY #REAR 11EBA RBNG RBN 1
02 CYL BAFFLE ASSY 21CAT LBNI LBN 1
02 CYL BAFFLE ASSY 21CAT RBNI RBN 1
02B CKT BKR COWL FLAPS 42FAR LBNI LBN A
02B CKT BKR COWL FLAPS 42FAR RBNI RBN A
02 COMBUSTIBLE MIX DELIVERY LBP LBH AAAAAAAAAA
02 COMBUSTIBLE MIX DELIVERY RBP RBH AAAAAAAAAA
02 AIR THROTTLE/FUEL METER AS21GAB LHPA LBP 2
02 AIR THROTTLE/FUEL METER AS21GAB RBPA RBP 2
02 INDUCTION AIR LBP LBH AAAAAAAAAA
02 INDUCTION AIR LBP LBH FAAAAAAAAA
02 INDUCTION AIR LBP LBH AAAAAAAAAA
02 INDUCTION AIR LBP LBH FAAAAAAAAA
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02	AIRBOX ASSY	21JAC	LBPBA	LBPB	5	
02	AIRBOX ASSY	21JAC	RBPBA	RBPB	5	
02	MANIFOLD, FUTAKE	21JAJ	LBPBB	LBPB	1	
02	MANIFOLD, FUTAKE	21JAJ	RBPBB	RBPB	1	
02	TUBE ASSY	21JAB	LBPBC	LBPB	1	
02	TUBE ASSY	21JAB	RBPBC	RBPB	1	
02	AIR INDUCTION CONT LEVER	21MAE	LBPBD	LBPB	A	
02	AIR INDUCTION CONT LEVER	21MAE	RBPBD	RBPB	A	
02	AIR INDUCTION TELEFLEX	21MAF	LBPBF	LBPB	A	
02	AIR INDUCTION TELEFLEX	21MAF	RBPBF	RBPB	A	
02	MANIFOLD PRESS IND		LBPBX	LBPB	KLBDJ	111111111
02	MANIFOLD PRESS IND		RBPBX	RBPB	KRBDJ	111111111
02	GAGE, MAN PRESS	21RG1	LBPBXA	LBPBX	8	
02	GAGE, MAN PRESS	21RG1	RBPBXA	RBPBX	8	
02	NORMAL INDUCTION AIR		LBPB	LBPB	LBDJ	111111111
02	NORMAL INDUCTION AIR		RBPB	RBPB	RBDJ	111111111
02	FILTER	21JAA	LBPBA	LBPB	1	
02	FILTER	21JAA	RBPBA	RBPB	1	
02	ALTERNATE INDUCTION AIR		LBPB	LBPB	KLBPB	AAAAAAAAA
02	ALTERNATE INDUCTION AIR		RBPB	RBPB	KRBPB	AAAAAAAAA
02	DUCT ALT AIR	21JAG	LBPDA	LBPB	0	
02	DUCT ALT AIR	21JAG	RBPDA	RBPB	0	
02	LEVER AIR INDUCTION CONTROL	21MAE	LBPDB	LBPB	A	
02	LEVER AIR INDUCTION CONTROL	21MAE	RBPDB	RBPB	A	
02	TELEFLEX	21MAF	LBPDC	LBPB	A	
02	TELEFLEX	21MAF	RBPDC	RBPB	A	
02	SPRING	21JAK	LBPDD	LBPB	1	
02	SPRING	21JAK	RBPDD	RBPB	1	
02	FUEL INJECTION		LBPE	LBPE		AAAAAAAAA
02	FUEL INJECTION		LBPE	LBPEX		FAAAAAAAAAA
02	FUEL INJECTION		RBPE	RBPE		AAAAAAAAA
02	FUEL INJECTION		RBPE	RBPEX		FAAAAAAAAAA
02	PUMP/VAPOR SEP	21GAA	LBPEA	LBPE	4	
02	PUMP/VAPOR SEP	21GAA	RBPFA	RBPB	4	
02	FUEL MANIFOLD VALVE	21GAC	LBPEB	LBPE	8	
02	FUEL MANIFOLD VALVE	21GAC	RBPFB	RBPB	8	
02	HOSE	21GAD	LBPEC	LBPE	A	
02	HOSE	21GAD	RBPFC	RBPB	A	
02	NOZZLES %6 EAC	21GAE	LBPED	LBPE	2	
02	NOZZLES %6 EAC	21GAE	RBPED	RBPB	2	
02	TUBES	21GAF	LBPEE	LBPE	8	
02	TUBES	21GAF	RBPFE	RBPB	8	
02	FUEL FLOW INDICATION		LBPEX	LBPE	ILBDJ	111111111
02	FUEL FLOW INDICATION		RBPFX	RBPB	IRBDJ	111111111
02	INDICATOR	21PH1	LBPEXA	LBPEX	A	
02	INDICATOR	21PH1	RBPFA	RBPB	A	
02	MIXTURE CONTROL		LBPE	LBPE		555555555
02	MIXTURE CONTROL		RBPB	RBPB		555555555
02	LEVER, MIXTURE	21MAC	LBPFA	LBPE	A	
02	LEVER, MIXTURE	21MAC	RBPFA	RBPB	A	

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1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
02  TELEFLEX          21MAK  21MAD  LBPFB  LBPFB  A
02  TELEFLEX          21MAK  21MAD  RBPFB  RBPFB  A
02  CONTROLEX         21MAD  21MAK  LBPFC  LBPFC  A
02  CONTROLEX         21MAD  21MAK  RBPFC  RBPFC  A
02  THROTTLE CONTROL  21MAK  21MAD  LBPGB  LBPGB  A
02  THROTTLE CONTROL  21MAK  21MAD  RBPGB  RBPGB  A
02  THROTTLE LEVER    21MAK  21MAD  LBPGB  LBPGB  A
02  THROTTLE LEVER    21MAK  21MAD  RBPGB  RBPGB  A
02  TELEFLEX          21MAJ  21MAB  LBPGB  LBPGB  2
02  TELEFLEX          21MAJ  21MAB  RBPGB  RBPGB  2
02  CONTROLEX         21MAJ  21MAB  LBPGB  LBPGB  2
02  CONTROLEX         21MAJ  21MAB  RBPGB  RBPGB  2
02  ENGINE PRIMING    21MAJ  21MAB  LBPGB  LBPGB  2
02  ENGINE PRIMING    21MAJ  21MAB  RBPGB  RBPGB  2
02  PRIMING CONTROL   21MAJ  21MAB  LBPGB  LBPGB  2
02  PRIMING CONTROL   21MAJ  21MAB  RBPGB  RBPGB  2
02  ENGINE FUEL DELIVERED  21MAJ  21MAB  LBPGB  LBPGB  2
02  ENGINE FUEL DELIVERED  21MAJ  21MAB  RBPGB  RBPGB  2
02  FUEL STRAINER     46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  1
02  FUEL STRAINER     46LAA  LBRAB  RBRAB  RBRAB  1
02  STRAINER DRAIN KNOB 46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  0
02  STRAINER DRAIN KNOB 46LAA  LBRAB  RBRAB  RBRAB  0
02  VAPOR RETURN CHECK VALVE 46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  1
02  VAPOR RETURN CHECK VALVE 46LAA  LBRAB  RBRAB  RBRAB  1
02  HOSE- UNION/FIREWALL 46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  8
02  HOSE- PUMP/UNION    46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  8
02  HOSE- PUMP/FILTER   46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  8
02  HOSE- FUEL FLOW     46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  8
02  HOSE- PUMP/FIREWALL 46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  8
02  HOSE- PUMP/FILTER   46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  8
02  HOSE- FUEL FLOW     46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  8
02  EMERGENCY CROSS FEED 46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  8
02  EMERGENCY CROSS FEED 46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  8
02  VALVE              46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  A
02  VALVE              46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  A
02  NORMAL FEED        46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  A
02  NORMAL FEED        46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  A
02  SELECTOR VALVE     46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  A
02  SELECTOR VALVE     46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  A
02  GEARBOX            46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  A
02  GEARBOX            46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  A
02  HANDLE SELECTOR    46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  A
02  HANDLE SELECTOR    46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  A
02  CABLE FUEL SELECTOR 46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  A
02  CABLE FUEL SELECTOR 46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  A
02  NORMAL LEFT FEED    46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  A
02  NORMAL LEFT/RIGHT FEED 46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  A
02  NORMAL RIGHT FEED   46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  A
02  NORMAL LEFT/RIGHT FEED 46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  A
02  ALTERNATE LEFT/RIGHT FEED 46LAA  LBRAB  LBRAB  LBRAB  A

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FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

000000001111111112222222223333333334444444445555555556666666667777777778
 1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

02 ALTERNATE LEFT/RIGHT FEED	RBRE	RBRC	KRRRD	AAAAAAAA
02 FUEL QTY INDICATED	LBRF	LBRF		11111111
02 FUEL QTY INDICATED	RHRF	KBRF		11111111
02 GAGE	46GAA LBRFA	LBRF		8
02 GAGE	46GAA RBRFA	RBRF		8
02B SELECTOR SWITCH	46GAB LBRFH	LHRF		A
02B SELECTOR SWITCH	46GAB RBRFH	RBRF		A
02A MICROSWITCH	46GAC LBRFC	LBRF		A
02A MICROSWITCH	46GAC RBRFC	RBRF		A
02A HANDLE SELECTOR	46EAC LBRFD	LBRF		A
02A HANDLE SELECTOR	46EAC RBRFD	RBRF		A
02A GEARBOX	46EAB LBRFE	LBRF		A
02A GEARBOX	46EAB RBRFE	RBRF		A
02A CKT BKR COWLFLAPS	42FAB LBRFG	LBN		A
02 CKT BKR	42FAB LBRFG	LBRF		A
02A CKT BKR COWLFLAPS	42FAB RBRFG	RBN		A
02 CKT BKR	42FAB RBRFG	RBRF		A
02 FUEL QTY DET %AUX<	LBRG	LBRF		22222222
02 FUEL QTY DET %AUX<	RBRG	RHRF		22222222
02 TRANSMITTER.QTY AUX	46GAF LBRGA	LBRG		8
02 TRANSMITTER.QTY AUX	46GAF RBRGA	RBRG		8
02 FUEL QTY DET%MAIN<	LBRH	LBRF		88888888
02 FUEL QTY DET%MAIN<	RBRH	RHRF		88888888
02 TRANSMITTER %OUTBOK	46GAD LBRHA	LBRH		8
02 TRANSMITTER %OUTBOK	46GAD RBRHA	RBRH		8
02 TRANSMITTER %IN BOK	46GAE LBRHB	LBRH		8
02 TRANSMITTER %IN BOK	46GAE RBRHB	RBRH		8
02 AUX SUPPLY	LBSA	LBRD		22222222
02 AUX SUPPLY	LBSA	LBRG		FAAAAAAAAA
02 AUX SUPPLY	RBSA	RBRD		22222222
02 AUX SUPPLY	RBSA	RBRG		FAAAAAAAAA
02 AUX TANK ASSY	46CAA LBSAA	LBSA		9
02 AUX TANK ASSY	46CAA RBSAA	RBSA		9
02 VALVE QUICK DRAIN	46CAC LBSAB	LBSA		1
02 VALVE QUICK DRAIN	46CAC RBSAB	RBSA		1
02 MAIN SUPPLY	LBSB	LBRD		88888888
02 LEFT MAIN SUPPLY	LBSB	RBRB		AAAAAAAAAA
02 MAIN SUPPLY	LBSB	LBRH		FAAAAAAAAA
02 MAIN SUPPLY	RBSB	RBRD		88888888
02 RIGHT MAIN SUPPLY	RBSB	LBRB		AAAAAAAAAA
02 MAIN SUPPLY	RBSB	RBRH		FAAAAAAAAA
02 MAIN TANK ASSY	46AAA LBSBA	LBSB		9
02 MAIN TANK ASSY	46AAA RBSBA	RBSB		9
02 HOSE INTERCONNECT	46AAC LBSBH	LBSB		9
02 HOSE INTERCONNECT	46AAC RBSBH	RBSB		9
02 VALVE VENT LINE CHECK	46AAD LBSBC	LBSB		3
02 VALVE VENT LINE CHECK	46AAD RBSBC	RBSB		3
02 SUMP TANK ASSY	46HAA LBSBD	LBSB		A
02 SUMP TANK ASSY	46HAA RBSBD	RBSB		A
02 VALVE QUICK DRAIN	46PAB LBSBE	LBSB		1

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0000000001111111112222222222333333333344444444445555555555666666666677777777778
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
02 VALVE QUICK DRAIN 46RAB RBSRE RBSB 1
02 AUX PRESSURE 46DAA RBSC LBSB 11111111
02 AUX PRESSURE 46EAA RBSC RBSR 11111111
02 AUX PUMP 46LAA LBSCA LBSC A
02 AUX PUMP 46DAA RBSCA RBSC A
02 AUX PUMP SWITCH 46EAA LBSCB LBSC A
02 AUX PUMP SWITCH 46EAA RBSCB RBSC A
02 CKT BKR AUX PUMP 42FAB LBSCC LBSC A
02 CKT BKR AUX PUMP 42FAB RBSCC RBSC A
02 CKT BKR 42FAB RBSCC DP A
02 INFO ONLY,ENGINE FAILURE BX BX FAAAAAAAAA
02 COM/NAV IDENT C C F AAAAAAAAAA
02 COMMUNICATION CA C 001111120
02 EXTERNAL COMM ATTN CAA CA 11111111
02 REDUNDANCY ATTN CAB CAA 11111111
02 SECURE VOICE CAD CAA 000000000
02 CODER UNIT 69AA1 CADA CAD A
02 MOUNT CODER 69AH1 CAUB CAD 0
02 CONTROL UNIT 69AC1 CADC CAD A
02 RELAY 69AD1 CADD CAD A
02 CIRCUIT BREAKER 42FCD CADE CAD 8
02 UHF-AM COMM CAE CAH 11111111
02 RECEIVER-TRANSMITTER 63AA1 CAFA CAE 8
02 CHASSIS ASSY 63AAA CAFB CAE 8
02 PREAMP-RF 63AAB CAEC CAE 8
02 AMPLIFIER-IF 63AAC CAED CAE 8
02 AMPLIFIER-IF 63AAD CAEE CAE 8
02 MODULATOR-AUDIO AMP 63AAE CAEF CAE 8
02 SPECTRUM GENERATOR 63AAF CAEG CAE 8
02 POWER AMPLIFIER XMITTR 63AAG CAEH CAE 3
02 RECEIVER-GUARD 63AAH CAEJ CAE 1
02 PWR SUPPLY 63AAJ CAEK CAE 8
02 MECHANICAL TUNER 63AAK CAEL CAE 8
02 INDICATOR SWR 63AB1 CAEM CAE 0
02 BLOWER EXTERNAL 63AC1 CAEN CAF A
02 MOUNT-R/T 63AD1 CAEP CAE 0
02 CONTROL UNIT 63AF1 CAEQ CAE 8
02 ANTENNA 63AF1 CAER CAF 8
02 ANTENNA 63AF1 CAER CAG 8
02 FILTER-POWER 63AG1 CAES CAE 7
02 CIRCUIT BREAKER 42FCD CAET CAE 8
02 VHF-FM COMM CAF CAB 11111111
02 VHF-FM COMM CAF CCK AAAAAAAAAA
02 RECEIVER-TRANSMITTER 62AA1 CAFA CAF 8
02 CHASSIS ASSY 62AAA CAFB CAF 8
02 MODULATION AMP,XMITTER 62AAH CAFD CAF 3
02 AUDIO AMP 62AAC CAFD CAF 8
02 IF AMP 62AAE CAFF CAF 8
02 RF OSCILLATOR 62AAF CAFF CAF 8
02 ATTENUATOR VARIABLE 62AAG CAFG CAF 8

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FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

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0000000001111111112222222223333333334444444445555555556666666667777777778
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
02 PWR SUPPLY 62AAH CAF 8
02 CONTROL UNIT-RF 62AAJ CAFJ 8
02 RF AMP 2A6500C 62AAK CAFK 8
02 RF AMP 2A6600C 62AAL CAFL 8
02 OSCILLATOR BUFFER 62AAM CAFM 8
02 VHF-TUNER 62AAN CAFN 8
02 XTAL REF 62AAP CAFP 8
02 GEAR BOX 62AAQ CAFQ 8
02 VOLTAGE REG 62AAR CAFR 8
02 MOUNT R/T UNIT 62AP1 CAFS 0
02 CONTROL UNIT 62AC1 CAFT 8
02 SPIKE ANT 62AD1 CAFU 8
02 COUPLER ANT 62AE1 CAFV 8
02 FILTER-DC PWR 62AG1 CAFW 7
02 CIRCUIT BREAKER 42FCD CAFX 8
02 VHF-AM COMM CAG CAB 111111111
02 RECEIVER/TRANSMITTER 62PA1 CAGA 8
02 CHASSIS ASSY 62HAA CAGB 8
02 RECEIVER ASSY 62HAB CAGC 8
02 EXCITER AMP, XMITTER 62HAC CAGD 3
02 PWR SUPPLY 62HAD CAGE 8
02 PWR CONTROL-SIDETONE 62HAE CAGF 8
02 MODULATOR 62HAF CAGG 3
02 RF AMP 62FAG CAGH 8
02 MOUNT R/T 62PH1 CAGJ 0
02 CONTROL UNIT 62PC1 CAGK 8
02 POTENTIOMETER-SQUELCH 42FCG CAGL 5
02 CIRCUIT BREAKER 42FCD CAGM 8
02 COMICS CAH CAA AAAAAAAAAA
02 TRANSMIT CONTROL CAJ CAH 333333333
02A MIC AMP 2 FA 64AB 64AB CAJA 1
02B MIC AMP 64AB 64AB CAJA 8
02A MIC AMP 2 EA 64AB 64AB CAJB 1
02B MIC AMP 64AB 64AB CAJB 8
02A TALK BUTTON,CONT WHEEL 64AF1 CAJC 1
02B TALK BUTTON,CONT WHEEL 64AF1 CAJC 8
02A FOOT SWITCH 64AG1 CAJD 0
02B FOOT SWITCH 64AG1 CAJD 1
02A CORDAGE,HEADSET PILOT 64AD1 CAJE 1
02B CORDAGE,HEADSET PILOT 64AD1 CAJE 8
02A CORDAGE HEADSET COPILOT 64AE1 CAJF 1
02B CORDAGE HEADSET COPILOT 64AE1 CAJF 0
02 RECEIVER CONTROL CAH 777777777
02 RECEIVER CONTROL CAK CAM AAAAAAAAAA
02A HEADSET AMP 2 FA 64ABC 64AAC CAKA 1
02B HEADSET AMP 64ABC 64AAC CAKA 8
02A HEADSET AMP 2 EA 64AAC 64AAC CAKB 1
02B HEADSET AMP 64AAC 64AAC CAKB 8
02 AUDIO PROCESSING CAL CAH AAAAAAAAAA
02 AUDIO PROCESSING CAL CAM AAAAAAAAAA
02A CONTROL AIC-18 2 FA 64AB1 64AA1 CAL 1

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PAGE 95. JIRI DATE = 01/12/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

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1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
02B CONTROL AIC-18          64AH1 64AA1 CALA CAL 8
02A CONTROL AIC-25 2EA 64AA1 64AB1 CALB CAL 1
02A CONTROL AIC-25 64AA1 64AB1 CALB CAL 8
02A CHASSIS ASSY 2EA 64ABA 64AAA CALC CAL 1
02B CHASSIS ASSY 64ABA 64AAA CALC CAL 8
02A CHASSIS ASSY 2EA 64AAA 64ABA CALD CAL 1
02B CHASSIS ASSY 64AAA 64ABA CALD CAL 8
02 TERM BLOCK 64AC1 CALE CAL 0
02 RESISTORS 42FBF CALF CAL 1
02 CIRCUIT BREAKER 42FAB CALG CAL A
02 NAV/ICS CONTROL CAM CCD F111111111
02 NAV/ICS CONTROL CAM CCM AAAAAAAAAA
02 IDENTIFICATION CB C 000000000
02A IFF CB 888888888
02B IFF CB AAAAAAAAAA
02 R/T APX-64 65AC1 65AA1 CHAA CRA 8
02 R/T APX-72 65AA1 65AC1 CHAB CRA 8
02 CHASSIS ASSY 65ACA 65AAA CHAC CRA 8
02 CHASSIS ASSY 65AAA 65ACA CBAD CRA 8
02 RF MODULE 65ACB 65AAB CBAE CRA 8
02 RF MODULE 65AAB 65ACB CBAF CRA 8
02 IF MODULE 65AAC CBAG CRA 8
02 DECODER MODULE 65AAD CHAH CRA 8
02 DELAY LINE MODULE 65AAE CRAJ CRA 8
02 CODER MODULE 65AAF CHAK CRA 8
02 REF SIG GEN MODULE 65AAG CHAL CRA 8
02 POWER SUPPLY MODULE 65AAJ CBAM CRA 8
02 TEST MODULE 65AAK CHAN CRA 0
02 MOUNT R/T APX-64 65AB1 CRAP CRA 0
02 MODULATOR 65ACC CBAQ CRA 8
02 DETECTOR 65ACD CBAR CRA 8
02 PRINTED CRKT CASE 65ACE CHAS CRA 8
02 ENCODER CONT. 65ACF CHAT CRA 8
02 ENCODER CLOCK 65ACG CBAU CRA 8
02 DECODER 65ACH CBAV CRA 8
02 PWR SUPPLY 65ACJ CBAW CRA 8
02 ENCODER GATING 65ACK CBAX CRA 8
02 MODE 4 MODULE 65ACL CBAZ CRA 8
02 PROCESSOR 65ACM CBAZA CRA 8
02 XMTTR MODULE 65ACN CRAZB CRA 8
02 PCVR MODULE 65ACP CBAZC CRA 8
02 DELAY LINE 65ACQ CBAZD CRA 8
02 MOUNT R/T APX-72 65AD1 CBAZE CRA 0
02 CONTROL UNIT 65AF1 CBAZF CRA 8
02 TEST SET XPNDR 65AF1 CBAZG CRA 0
02 SIG GEN : REC 65AFA CBAZH CRA 0
02 EVALUATOR 65AFB CRAZJ CBA 8
02 TIMMING ASSY 65AFC CRAZK CBA 8
02 DIRECTIONAL CPLR 65AFD CRAZL CBA 8
02 REGULATOR ASSY 65AFF CBAZM CBA 8

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02	CRKT CARD ASSY	65AFF	CHAZN	CRA	8	
02	MOUNT TEST SET	65AG1	CHAZP	CHA	0	
02	ANTENNA 2EACH	65AH1	CHAZQ	CRA	2	
02	SW UNIT ANTENNA	65AM1	CHAZR	CBA	2	
02	UHF HOLD RELAYXUNKNC	65AN1	CBAZS	CBA	0	
02	SW ANTENNA SEL	65AP1	CBAZT	CBA	2	
02	IFF CAUTION LITE	65AQ1	CBAZU	CBA	0	
02	CRYPTO COMPUTER	65BA1	CHAZV	CRA	1	
02	MOUNT CRYPTO	65CB1	CBAZW	CHA	0	
02	CONNECTOR	65BBA	CBAZX	CBA	1	
02	WIRING	65BC1	CHAZY	CBA	1	
02	CIRCUIT BREAKER 2 EA	42FCU	CBAZZ	CHA	8	
02	TRANSMITTER MODULE	65AAH	CBAZZA	CBA	8	
02	RAQADAR BEACON		CBB	CBB		333333333
02	RECEIVER/XMITR	72AA1	CBBB	CBB	8	
02	RF MODULE	72AAA	CBBB	CBB	8	
02	IF AMP	72AAB	CBBB	CBB	8	
02	ENCODER/DECODER	72AAC	CBBB	CBB	8	
02	MODULATOR	72AAD	CBBB	CBB	8	
02	PWR SUPPLY	72AAF	CBBB	CBB	8	
02	ANT ASSY	72AB1	CBBB	CBB	8	
02	CIRCUIT BREAKER	42FCD	CBBB	CBB	3	
02	NAVIGATION		CC	C		001111110
02	CLOCK	51RAK	CCAA	CC	0	
02	HOUR METER	51BAL	CCAB	CC	0	
02	NAV. AIDS REDUN. ATTEN.		CCB	CC		111111111
02	TACAN INFO		CCD	CCB		111111111
02	REC/XMITR	71BA1	CCDA	CCD	8	
02	CHASSIS ASSY	71BAA	CCDB	CCD	8	
02	RF MODULE	71BAB	CCDC	CCD	8	
02	ANT SEL MODULE	71BAM	CCDD	CCD	2	
02	PWR SUPPLY	71BAP	CCDE	CCD	8	
02	MOUNT R/T	71BB1	CCDF	CCD	0	
02	CONTROL UNIT	71BC1	CCDG	CCD	8	
02	ANTENNA 2 FA	71BE1	CCDH	CCD	2	
02	FAN COOLING	71BJ1	CCDJ	CCD	A	
02	CAPACITOR	42FCF	CCDK	CCD	8	
02	CIRCUIT BREAKER 2 EA	42FCD	CCDL	CCD	8	
02	SWITCH-ANTENNA-UPP &LWR	71BD1	CCDM	CCD	8	
02	CABLES & CONNECTORS	71BF1	CCDN	CCD	5	
02	TACAN RANGE		CCE	CCD		222222242
02	RANGE DECODER	71BAC	CCEA	CCE	8	
02	RANGE A MODULE	71BAD	CCEB	CCE	8	
02	RANGE B MODULE	71BAF	CCEC	CCL	8	
02	RANGE MECH MODULE	71BAF	CCED	CCE	3	
02	AIR TO AIR MODULE	71BAN	CCEF	CCE	1	
02	BDHI DISPLAY		CCF	CCE		AAAAAAA1
02	BDHI INDICATOR	71PG1	CCFA	CCF	A	
02	TACAN BEARING		CCG	CCD		9999999A9
02	BEARING DECODER	71PAG	CCGA	CCG	8	

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000000000111111111222222222333333333444444445555555556666666667777777778
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
02 BEARING A MODULE 71BAH CCBG CCG 8
02 BEARING B MODULE 71BAJ CCBG CCG 8
02 BEARING MECH MODULE 71BAK CCBG CCG 8
02 MAG PHASE DET AMP 71BAL CCBG CCG 8
02 HDHI DISPLAY 71BG1 CCHA CCH 111111111
02 HDHI INDICATOR 71BG1 CCHA CCH A
02 COURSE INDICATOR DISPLAY CCH K CCH S33333333
02 COURSE INDICATOR DISPLAY CCH CCH F111111111
02 COURSE INDICATOR DISPLAY CCH CCH FAAAAA44444
02 COURSE INDICATOR 71BH1 CCJA CCJ A
02 CAPACITOR VERTICAL NEEDLE 42FBG CCJB CCJ 8
02 VHF/FM BEARING CCK CCB 111111101
02 VHF HOMING MODULE 62AAD CCKA CCK 8
02 ANTENNA HOMING 62AF1 CCKB CCK 8
02 SWITCH BEARING SEL 9962A CCKC CCK 5
02 LF/ADF BEARING CCM CCB 111111111
02 SIGNAL PROCESSING CCM CCM AAAAAA44444
02 RECVR 71AA1 CCNA CCN 8
02 CHASSIS ASSY 71AA4 CCNH CCN 8
02 FIRST RF AMP 71AAB CCNC CCN 8
02 MODULATOR 71AAC CCND CCN 8
02 RF AMP 71AAD CCNE CCN 8
02 IF AMP 71AAF CCNF CCN 8
02 AUDIO AMP 71AAF CCNG CCN 8
02 MIXER 71AAG CCNH CCN 8
02 LOCAL OSC 71AAH CCNJ CCN 8
02 BF OSC 71AAJ CCNK CCN 1
02 PWR SUPPLY 71AAK CCNL CCN 8
02 MOTOR GEAR CASE 71AAL CCNM CCN 8
02 RCVR MOUNT 71AB1 CCNN CCN 0
02 PWR INVERTER 71ABA CCNP CCN 8
02 CONTROL UNIT 71AC1 CCNQ CCN 8
02 LOOP ANTENNA 71AD1 CCNR CCN 8
02 COMPENSATOR 71ADA CCNS CCN 2
02 SENSE ANTENNA 71AE1 CCNT CCN 8
02 FILTER 71AJ1 CCNU CCN 4
02 CIRCUIT BREAKER 42FCD CCNV CCN 8
02 HDHI DISPLAY CCH CCM AAAAAA44444
02 HDHI INDICATOR 71BG1 CCHA CCP A
02 GYRO COMPASS INFO CCH CCV CCW 111111111
02 COMPASS SIG PROCESS CCH CCH AAAAAA44444
02A DIR GYRO ASSY 51BB1 CCRA CCR 8
02A DIR GYRO 51BRA CCRH CCR 8
02A PWR SUP-AMP 51BBB CCRC CCR 8
02A ELECT CONT AMP 51BPC CCRD CCR 8
02A MAG DET 51BBU CCNE CCR A
02A COMPENSATOR 51BBE CCRF CCR 2
02A ANNUNCIATOR XUKNK 51BBF CCRG CCR 0
02 MAG FLUX DET 51BAC CCRH CCR A
02 SLAVING IND 51BAH CCRJ CCR 0

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12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
02A DIRECTIONAL IND VAC %GYRO< 51RAG CCRK CCP 8
02A DIRECTIONAL IND %GYRO< 51EAD CCRK CCR 8
02 COMPASS DISPLAY CCS CCQ AAAAAAAAAA
02ADHI DISPLAY CCT CCS AAAAAAAAAA
02ADHI DISPLAY CCT CCS 11111111
02 ADHI INDICATOR 71RGI CCTA CCT 8
02ADHI IND DISPLAY CCU CCS 11111111
02 DIR IND 51BAG CCUA CCU A
02 HEADING CCV CC 001000110
02 STANDBY HEADING CCW K CCV AAAAAAAAAA
02 STANDBY COMPASS 51RAJ CCWA CCW 8
02 INFORMATION AND DISPLAY D AAAAAAAAAA
02 FLIGHT STATUS DA D 011111130
02 OUTSIDE AIRTEMP DB DA 000000000
02 OAT INDICATOR 51EAC DBA DB H
02 ALTITUDE INDICATION DC DA E 00A111A0
02 BAROMETRIC ALTITUDE DD CBA 11111111
02 BAROMETRIC ALTITUDE DD DC AAAAAAAAAA
02 ALTIMETER 51CAK 51CAB DDA DD 8
02 ALTIMETER AAU-21 51CAH 51CAK DDH DD 8
02 VERTICAL VELOCITY INDICATIO DE DC 000000000
02 VERT VELOCITY INDICATOR 51CAA DEA DF 8
02 ATTENUATION DF DA 111111111
02A G-LOAD INDICATION DG DF 000010000
02A ACCELEROMETER 51CAG DGA DG 8
02 AIRSPEED INDICATION DH DF 051010150
02 AIRSPEED INDICATOR 51RAA DHA DH 8
02 STATIC SOURCE DJ DC AAAAAAAAAA
02 STATIC SOURCE DJ DD FAAAAAAAAA
02 STATIC SOURCE DJ DE FAAAAAAAAA
02 STATIC SOURCE DJ DH AAAAAAAAAA
02 VALVE SOURCE SELECT 51DAB DJA DJ 0
02 BUTTON STATIC SOURCE %2FA<51DAD DJB DJ 1
02 PITOT SENSE DK DH AAAAAAAAAA
02 PITOT TUBE 51DAA DKA DK 8
02 PITOT HEAT DL DK A AAAAAAAAAA
02 PITOT HEAT DL DV A AAAAAAAAAA
02 SWITCH PITOT/STALL HEAT 51DAF DLA DL A
02 CKT BKR 42FAB DLH DL A
02 ATTITUDE DM DA E 0121111A0
02 PITCH/ROLL INDICATION DN DM DP 11111111
02A ATT IND ELECTRIC 51CAE DNA DN 8
02A ATT IND VACUUM 51CAF DNA DN 8
02 TURN/SUP INDICATION DP DM K DN AAAAAAAAAA
02 INDICATOR 51CAC DPA DP 8
02A ELECTRIC DRIVE DQ DN AAAAAAAAAA
02A CKT BKR 42FAB DQA DQ A
02A VACUUM DRIVE DR CCR AAAAAAAAAA
02A VACUUM DRIVE DR DN AAAAAAAAAA
02A GAGE SUCTION 51AAA DRA DR J

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12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
020 FILTER VACUUM 51AAC DRB DR 1
021 MANIFOLD 51AAG DRC DR 1
022 FRONT VACUUM SOURCE LDS DR KRDS AAAAAAAAAA
023 REAR VACUUM SOURCE RDS DR KLDS AAAAAAAAAA
024 VACUUM PUMP 51AAD LDSA LOS A
025 VACUUM PUMP 51AAC RDSA RDS A
026 RELIEF VALVE 51AAF LDSB LOS 1
027 RELIEF VALVE 51AAE RDSB RDS 1
028 CHECK VALVE 51AAF LDSC LOS 1
029 CHECK VALVE 51AAF RDSC RDS 1
030 OIL SEPERATOR 51AAB LDSD LOS 1
031 OIL SEPERATOR 51AAB RDSO RDS 1
02 WARNINGS DT D AAAAAAAAAA
02 ENGINE FIRE WARNING DU DT X AAAAAAAAAA
02 DETECTORS 4 EA 49BAA DUA DU 1
02 WIRING 49BAC DUB DU A
02 FIRE DET WARN LIGHT 9949A DUC DU A
02 STALL WARNING DV DT 000000000
02 DUAL WARN UNIT 51EAA DVA DV 8
02 DUAL WARNING UNIT 51EAA DVA NU 1
02 ACTUATOR STALL WARN 51EAB DVB DV A
02 TRANSISTOR 42FHC DVC DV A
02 AMP ASSY AURAL WARN 42FBD DVD DV 8
02 AMPLIFIER ASSY AURAL WNG 42FBD DVD NU 1
02 DIODE 42FRE DVE DV A
02 CKT BKR 42FAB DVF DV A
02 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL E AAAAAAAAAA
02 LIGHTING EA F D 111111121
02 INTERNAL LIGHTING EAA EA 011111110
02 NORMAL LIGHTING EAB EAA EAF 111111111
02 FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS EAC EAB 222222222
02 INSTRUMENT LIGHT SYSTEM 44AD1 EACA EAC 1
02 RHEOSTAT 44AE1 EACB EAC 5
02 CKT BKR 42FAB EACC EAC A
02 ENGINE INSTRUMENTS EAD EAB 111111111
02 INST LIGHT SYS 44AD1 EADA EAD 1
02 RHEOSTAT 44AE1 EADB EAD 5
02 CKT BKR 42FAB EADC EAD A
02 CKT BKR 42FAB EADC EAD A
02 SWITCH/CONTROL PANEL EAE EAB 000000000
02 INTERIOR LIGHT SYSTEM 44AC1 EAFA EAE 1
02 RHEOSTAT 44AE1 EAEH EAF 5
02 BACKUP LIGHTING EAF EAA K EAB AAAAAAAAAA
02 DOME LIGHTING EAG EAF 111111111
02 INTERIOR LIGHT SYSTEM 44AC1 EAGA EAG 1
02 CKT BKR 42FAB EAGB EAG A
02 CKT BKR 42FAB EAGB EAH A
02 UTILITY/MAP EAH EAF 111111111
02A INTERIOR LIGHT SYS 2 EA 44AC1 EAHA EAH 1
02B INTERIOR LIGHT SYSTEM 44AC1 EAHA EAH A

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FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

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0000000001111111112222222222333333333344444444445555555555666666666677777777778
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
028 RHEOSTAT 44AE1 FAHC EAH 5
028 RHEOSTAT 44AE1 FAHC FAJ 5
028 INSTRUMENT FLOOD FAJ EAF 111111111
028 INTERIOR LIGHT SYSTEM 44AC1 FAJA FAJ 1
028 CKT BKR 42FAB FAJB EAH A
028 CKT BKR 42FAB EAJB FAJ A
02 EXTERNAL LIGHTING EAK EA 111111111
02 ATTENUATION EAL EAK 111111111
02 ANTI COLLISION EAM EAL 000000000
02 ANTI COLLISION LIGHT 44AAA EAMA EAM A
02 CKT BKR 42FAB EAMB EAM A
02 LANDING EAN FAL 000000010
02 LANDING LIGHT SYSTEM 32EAC44AB1 EANA FAN 1
02 CKT BKR 42FAB FANC FAN A
02 TAXI EAP EAL 000000000
02 LAND LIGHT SYS&TAXI< 2 EA 44AB1 EAPA EAP 5
02 CKT BKR 42FAB EAPC FAP A
02 NAVIGATION EAQ EAL 000000000
02 NAV LIGHT SYS 44AA1 EAQA FAQ 2
02 CKT BKR 42FAB EAQB EAQ A
02 CABIN ENVIRONMENT ER E 111111111
02 WINDSHIELD CLEAR EHA FH Y 010000030
02 DEFROSTER CONTROL 41DAC EBAA CBA A
02 PILOTS DEFROST LEBB ERA KREBB AAAAAAAAAA
02 COPILOTS DEFROST REBB EBA KLEBB AAAAAAAAAA
02 VALVE 41CAA LEBBA LEBB 3
02 VALVE 41CAA REBBA REBB 3
02 DUCT 41CAB LEBBB LFBB 1
02 DUCT 41CAR REBBB REBB 1
02 OUTLET UNION 41CAC LEBBC LEBB 1
02 OUTLET UNION 41CAC REBBC REBB 1
02 CABIN HEATED EHC FB 000000000
02 PILOT AIR MIXING LEHD LERR AAAAAAAAAA
02 PILOT AIR MIXING LEHD EBC 111111111
02 COPILOT AIR MIXING REHD REBB AAAAAAAAAA
02 COPILOT AIR MIXING REHD EBC 111111111
02 AIRBOX 41AAA LEBDA LEBD 1
02 AIRBOX 41AAA REBDA REBD 1
02 BAFFLE 41AAB LEBDH LEBD 1
02 BAFFLE 41AAB REBDH REBD 1
02 VALVE 41AAC LEBDC LEBD 8
02 VALVE 41AAC REBDC REBD 8
02 VENT BOX 41AAD LEBDD LEHD 1
02 VENT BOX 41AAD REBDD REBD 1
02 AIR DUCT 41AAE LEBDE LFHD 1
02 AIR DUCT 41AAE REBDE REBD 1
02 CABIN HEAT CONTROL 41AAH LEHDF LEHD 8
02 CABIN HEAT CONTROL 41DAB REBDF REBD 8
02 EXHAUST MUFFLER 21NAD LEBDG LEHD 8
02 EXHAUST MUFFLER 21NAD REBDG REBD 8

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1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

02 SHROUD	21NAE	LEBDH	LEBD	1	
02 SHROUD	21NAE	REBDH	REBD	1	
02 CABIN HEAT	41UAA	LEBDJ	LEBD	8	
02 CABIN HEAT	41DAA	REBDJ	REBD	8	
02 VENTILATION		FRE	EB		000000000
02 VENT-AIR 2 FA	41PAA	EREA	ERE	2	
02 ADAPTER	41BAR	EBEB	EBF	1	
02 CONTROL CABIN AIR 2 EA	41DAB	EBEC	FRE	5	
02 AIR SCOOP	41BAC	EHFO	ERE	1	
02b PLENUM	41RAD	EHFE	FRF	1	
02 SHUTOFF VALVE	41BAE	EBEF	EBE	1	
02 INLET ASSY 2EA	41BAF	EBEG	EBF	3	
02 DUCT 2 EA	41BAG	EBFH	EBF	1	
02 CABIN HEAT	41DAA	EBEJ	EBE	5	
02 FLIGHT CONTROL		F			AAAAAAAAA
02 LIFT AUGMENTATION		FA	F		C 010000030
02 FLAPS POSITIONED		FAA	FA		AAAAAAAAA
02 LEFT FLAPS POSITIONED		LFAD	FAA		AAAAAAAAA
02 RIGHT FLAPS POSITIONED		RFAB	FAA		AAAAAAAAA
02 RIGHT FLAPS POSITIONED		RFAB	FCH		FAAAAAAAAAA
02 CABLE	14DAK	LFABA	LFAB	A	
02 CABLE	14DAK	RFABA	RFAB	A	
02 PULLEYS	14DAL	LFABB	LFAB	9	
02 PULLEYS	14DAL	RFABB	RFAB	8	
02 QUADRANT AND BELLCRANK	14DAR	LFABC	LFAB	7	
02 QUADRANT AND BELLCRANK	14DAR	RFABC	RFAB	7	
02 BELLCRANK	14DAS	LFABD	LFAB	3	
02 BELLCRANK	14DAS	RFABD	RFAB	3	
02 OUTBOARD FLAPS POSITIONED		LFAC	LFAB		666666666
02 OUTBOARD FLAPS POSITIONED		RFAC	RFAB		666666666
02 FLAP, OUTBD	14DAB	LFACA	LFAC	3	
02 FLAP, OUTBD	14DAB	RFACA	RFAC	3	
02 LINKS 2 EA	14DAM	LFACH	LFAC	5	
02 LINKS 2 EA	14DAM	RFACH	RFAC	5	
02 ROD	14DAT	LFACC	LFAC	5	
02 ROD	14DAT	RFACC	RFAC	5	
02 PANEL FLAP GAP	14DAC	LFACD	LFAC	0	
02 PANEL FLAP GAP	14DAC	RFACD	RFAC	0	
02 INBOARD FLAPS POSITIONED		LFAD	LFAB		444444444
02 INBOARD FLAPS POSITIONED		RFAD	RFAB		444444444
02 FLAP INBOARD	14DAA	LFADA	LFAD	3	
02 FLAP INBOARD	14DAA	RFADA	RFAD	3	
02 LINK	14DAM	LFADP	LFAD	A	
02 LINK	14DAM	RFADP	RFAD	A	
02 PANEL FLAP GAP	14DAC	LFADC	LFAD	0	
02 PANEL FLAP GAP	14DAC	RFADC	RFAD	0	
02 FLAP DRIVE		FAE	FA		AAAAAAAAA
02 FLAP MOTOR	14DAN	FAFA	FAE	A	
02 ACTUATOR	14DAQ	FAEB	FAE	8	
02 CKT BKR	42FAB	FAFC	FAE	A	

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FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

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1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
02 FLAP CONTROL FAF FAE AAAAAAAAAA
02 CONTROL LEVER 14DAD FAFA FAF 8
02 SWITCH FLAP OPERATING 14DAE FAFB FAF 7
02 CONTROL FOLLOW UP 14DAG FAFB FAF 1
02 POINTER POSITION 14DAF FAFD FAF 0
02 LIMIT SWITCHES 2 EA 14DAH FAFF FAF 3
02 YAW CONTROL FB F CAAAAAAG
02 RUDDERS POSITIONED FRA FH 010000030
02 LEFT RUDDER POSITIONED LFRB FBA 22222222
02 LEFT RUDDER POSITIONED LFRB FRA KRFBB AAAAAAAG
02 RIGHT RUDDER POSITIONED RFRB FRA 22222222
02 RIGHT RUDDER POSITIONED RFRB FBA KLFBB AAAAAAAG
02 RUDDER ASSY 14CAE LFRB LFRB 3
02 RUDDER ASSY 14CAF RFRB RFRB 3
02 BALANCE WEIGHT 14CAF LFRB LFRB 0
02 BALANCE WEIGHT 14CAF RFRB RFRB 0
02 RUDDER HINGE ASSY 11GBB LFRB LFRB 2
02 RUDDER HINGE ASSY 11GBB RFRB RFRB 2
02 RUDDER CONTROL FBC FRA AAAAAAAG
02 BELLCRANK 14CAB FBCA FBC A
02 RUDDER BAR LINK ROD ASSY 14CAD FBFB FBC A
02 CABLES 14CCA FBCC FBC A
02 PULLEY 14CDB FBBD FBC 8
02 BELLCRANK 2 EA 14CCD FBCE FBC 7
02 RUDDER PEDAL CONTROL FBD FBC 091111190
02 PEDAL SUPPORT 2 EA 14CAC FBDA FBD 1
02 RUDDER PEDAL 2 EA 14CAA FBDB FBD 1
02 TRIM CONTROL FBE FBC 11111111
02 WHEEL ASSY 14CDA FBFA FBF 8
02 TRIM INDICATOR 14CDB FBFB FBF 0
02 CHAIN 14CDD FBFC FBF A
02 SPROCKET 14CDE FBFD FBF A
02 ACTUATOR 14CDH FBFE FBF 7
02 HUNDEE 13CAA FBFF FBF 7
02 PITCH CONTROL FC F CAAAAAAG
02 ELEVATOR POSITIONED FCA FC AAAAAAAG
02 ELEVATOR 14BAA FCAB FCA 3
02 ARM AND BALANCE WEIGHT 14BAB FCAB FCA 0
02 ELEVATOR HINGE ASSY 11GAR FCAC FCA 3
02 ELEVATOR DRIVE/CONTROL FCB FCA 031111190
02 CABLE 14BBA FCBA FCB A
02 PULLEY 14BBB FCBB FCB 8
02 BELLCRANK 14BRC FCBC FCB A
02 ROD 14BRD FCBD FCB A
02 PILOT CONTROL FCC FCH K FCD AAAAAAAG
02 CONTROL WHEEL 14FAA FCCA FCC 1
02 BEARING 14FAH FCCB FCC 6
02 CONTROL COLUMN ASSY 14FAC FCCC FCC A
02 HUB WEIGHT 14FAF FCCD FCC 0
02 COPILOT CONTROL FCD FCR K FCC AAAAAAAG

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0000000001111111112222222222333333333344444444445555555555666666666677777777778
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
02 CONTROL WHEEL 14FAA FCDA FCD 1
02 BEARING 14FAH FCDB FCD 6
02 CONTROL COLUMN ASSY 14FAC FCDC FCD 4
023 BOB WEIGHT 14FAF FCDD FCD 0
02 TRIM TAB POSITIONED FCE FCA K FCB AAAAAAAAAA
02 TRIM TAB 14BAC FCEA FCE 1
02 INDICATOR 14BCB FCEB FCE 0
02 TRIM ACTUATOR 14BCH FCEC FCE 4
02 STOP BLOCK 14BCL FCED FCE 1
02 CHAIN 14BCD FCEF FCE 4
02 PULLEY 14BCG FCEFF FCE 3
02 CABLE 14BCE FCEG FCE 4
02A MANUAL TRIM FCF FCE FCG 111111111
02B MANUAL TRIM FCF FCF AAAAAAAAAA
02 TRIM CONTROL WHEEL 14BCA FCFA FCF 3
02 SPRCKET 14BCC FCFB FCF 8
02A ELECTRIC TRIM FCG FCF FCF 111111111
02A SWITCH ELECTRIC TRIM 14BCJ FCGA FCG 4
02A ELECTRIC TRIM DRIVE 14BCK FCGB FCG 4
02A CIRCUIT BREAKER 42FAR FCGC FCG 4
02 FLAPS/ELEVATOR INTERCONNECT FCH FCF 000000010
02 INTERCONNECT CABLE ASSY 14DAU FCHA FCH 4
02 ROLL CONTROL FD F 0AAAAAAAAA
02 AILERONS POSITIONED FDA FD AAAAAAAAAA
02 LEFT AILERON POSITIONED LFDB FDA 222222222
02 LEFT AILERON POSITIONED LFDB FDA KRFDB AAAAAAAAAA
02 RIGHT AILERON POSITIONED RFDB FDA 222222222
02 RIGHT AILERON POSITIONED RFDB FDA KLFDB AAAAAAAAAA
02 AILERON 14AAA LFDBA LFDB 3
02 AILERON 14AAA RFDBA RFDB 3
02 BALANCE WEIGHT 14AAB LFDBB LFDB 0
02 BALANCE WEIGHT 14AAB RFDBB RFDB 0
02 TRIM TAB 14AAC LFDRC LFDB 0
02 TRIM TAB 14AAC RFDBC RFDB 0
02 ROD 14AAG LFDDB LFDB 4
02 ROD 14AAG RFDBD RFDB 4
02 AILERON CONTROL FDC FDA AAAAAAAAAA
02 PULLEY 14AAE FDCA FDC 8
02 BELLCRANK 2 EA 14AAF FDCB FDC 7
02 CABLE 14AAH FDCC FDC 4
02 PILOT CONTROL FDD FDC K FDE AAAAAAAAAA
02 CONTROL WHEEL 14FAA FDDA FDD 1
02 BEARING 14FAH FDOB FDD 6
02 CONTROL COLUMN ASSY 14FAC FDDC FDD 4
02 COPILOT CONTROL FDE FDC K FDD AAAAAAAAAA
02 CONTROL WHEEL 14FAA FDEA FDE 1
02 BEARING 14FAB FDEB FDE 6
02 CONTROL COLUMN ASSY 14FAC FDEC FDE 4
02 GROUND CONTROL G AAAAAAAAAA
02 SPEED CONTROL GA G C 0000000A0

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12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
02 SPEED CONTROL GA GAX 500000005
02 ATTENUATION GAX G 111111111
02 DIRECTIONAL CONTROL GB G 110000011
02 WHEEL BRAKES GC GA AAAAAAAAAA
02 WHEEL BRAKES GC GB K GG AAAAAAAAAA
02 MASTER CYLINDER 2 EACH 13FAD GCA GC 8
02 WHEEL CYLINDER 2 SETS 13FAE GCB GC 8
02 PRESSURE PLATE 2 SETS 13FAG GCC GC 1
02 BACK PLATE 2 SETS 13FAH GCD GC 1
02 LINING 2 SETS 13FAJ GCE GC 1
02 TORQUE PLATE 2 SETS 13FAK GCF GC A
02 DISC 2 SETS 13FAL GCG GC 1
02 TUBING 2 SETS 13FAM GCH GC 8
02 HOSE 2 SETS 13FAN GCJ GC 8
02 PARKING BRAKE 13FAA GDA GD 8
02 CONTROL ASSY 13FAC GDB GD A
02 PARKING BRAKE VALVE 13FAC GDB GD A
02 PILOT ACTUATION GE GC GF 111111111
02 BRAKE PEDAL LINK 13FAB GEA GE A
02 RUDDER/BRAKE PEDAL 14CAA GER GE A
02 PEDAL SUPPORT 14CAC GEC GF A
02 COPILOT ACTUATION GF GC K GE AAAAAAAAAA
02 BRAKE PEDAL LINK 13FAB GFA GF A
02 RUDDER/BRAKE PEDAL 14CAA GFB GF A
02 PEDAL SUPPORT 14CAC GFC GF A
02 NOSE WHEEL STEERING GG GB GC 111111111
02 BUNGEE 13GAA GGA GG A
02 STEERING CAM 13GAB GGB GG A
02 BELL CRANK 13GAC GGC GG A
02 LOCK 13GAD GGD GG 0
02 ROD 13GAE GGE GG A
02 STEERING COLLAR 13CAF GGF GG A
02 TORQUE LINK 13CAF GGG GG A
02 RUDDER BARLINK/ROD ASSY 14CAD GGH GG 8
02 SHIMMY DAMPENER 13CEB GGJ GC 0
02 PILOT CONTROL LGH GG RGH 111111111
02 COPILOT CONTROL RGH GG KLGH AAAAAAAAAA
02 RUDDER/BRAKE PEDAL 14CAA LGHA LGH A
02 RUDDER/BRAKE PEDAL 14CAA RGH RGH A
02 PEDAL SUPPORT 14CAC LGHB LGH A
02 PEDAL SUPPORT 14CAC RGH RGH A
02 MISSION SUPPORT M
02A OFFENSIVE ARMAMENT MA M 020010020
02A SUSPENSION/RELEASE MAA MA 111111111
02A STORES SUSPENSION MAB MAA 111111111
02A PYLON ASSY, INBD *2EAC 75ABD MABA MAH 1
02A SHELL *2EAC 75ABA MARH MAH 0
02A FAIRING *2EAC 75ABC MARC MAR 0
02A FAIRING *2EAC 75ABD MARD MAR 0
02A SWAY BRACE ASSY *2EAC 75ABE MAHE MAR 1

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1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
02A RACK,BOMB%MA-4< %2EAC 75ABJ MABF MAB 1
02A PYLON ASSY OUTBD %2EAC 75ACG MABG MAH 1
02A SHELL %2EAC 75ACA MAHH MAB 0
02A FAIRING %2FA< 75ACC MAHJ MAB 0
02A FAIRING %2EAC 75ACD MABK MAB 0
02A SWAY BRACE ASSY %2FA< 75ACE MABL MAB 1
02A RACK BOMB %MA-4< %2FA< 75ACJ MABM MAB 1
02A GUNS MAC MAB 111111111
02A MACHINE GUN POD SUU-11A 75CAC MACA MAC 1
02A MACHINEGUN ASSY 75CAA MACB MAC 1
02A SWITCH-GUN BATT CHARGE 75BAB MACC MAC 0
02A CKT BKR GUN BATT CHARGE 42FAB MACD MAC 0
02A BOMBS/ROCKETS/MISSILES MAD MAB 111111111
02A DISPENSER,BOMBRAK %4EAC 75CFO MAD MAD 1
02A SWAY BRACE ASSY %4EAC 75CFA MADB MAD 0
02A SHELL ASSY %4EAC 75CFC MADC MAD 0
02A BOMB RACK %MA-4< %4EAC 75CFD MADD MAD 1
02A LAUNCHER ROCKET LAU-59 75CGO MADE MAD 1
02A LAUNCHER ROCKET LAU-58 75CHU MADF MAJ 1
02A BOMB DISPENSER CBW-14 75CJO MADG MAD 1
02A SWITCH PYLON RACK 75ABG MAUH MAD 0
02A SWITCH PYLON RACK 75ACG MADJ MAD 0
02A ARMAMENT CONTROL MAE MAA 111111111
02A ARMING MAF MAE 000000000
02A HANDLE ASSY ARMING %2EAC 75ABF MAFA MAF 2
02A SOLENOID ARMING %4FA< 75ABK MAFB MAF 1
02A LEVER COCKING %2FA< 75ABL MAFD MAF 2
02A HANDLE ASSY ARMING %2EAC 75ACF MAFD MAF 2
02A SOLENOID ARMING %4FA< 75ACK MAFE MAF 1
02A LEVER COCKING %2EAC 75ACL MAFF MAF 2
02A SALVO ARM-RELEASE RELAY 75AAB MAFG MAF A
02A ARM SWITCH 75BAE MAFH MAF A
02A MASTER ARMAMENT SWITCH 75BAF MAFJ MAF A
02A CKT BKR %10AC ARMING CKTS 42FAB MAFK MAF A
02A NORMAL RELEASE/FIRE MAG MAE MAH 111111111
02A MASTER ARMAMENT SWITCH 75BAE MAGA MAG A
02A FIRE/DROP RELAY %2EAC 75AAA MAGB MAG 5
02A FIRE/DROP SWITCH %4EAC 75BAC MAGC MAG 2
02A CKT BKR %20AC %2EAC 42FAB MAGD MAG 5
02A TRIGGER SWITCH 75AAD MAGF MAG A
02A PANEL ELECTROLUMINENT 75BAH MAGF MAG 0
02A POWER SUPPLY-PANEL 75BAJ MAGG MAG 0
02A DIODE %2EAC 75AAH MAGH MAG 1
02A SOVAT SWITCH 13CCC MAGJ MAG 5
02A CKT BKR %3AC GRD DISABLF 42FAB MAGK MAG A
02A EMERGENCY SALVO MAH MAE K MAG AAAAAA
02A SALVO-ARM RELEASE RELAY 75AAB MAHA MAH A
02A JETTISON SWITCH 75AAC MAHB MAH A
02A AIMING MAJ MA 000000000
02A GUNSIGHT ASSY 74AAA MAJA MAJ 8

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12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
02A RHEOSTAT 74AAD MAJB MAJ 8
02A CKT BKR GUNSIGHT 42FAB MAJC MAJ A
02A PHOTO/RECON MR M 000000000
02A CAMERA ASSY KB-18 77AAA MBA MB 8
02A CONTROL 77AAE MBR MB 8
02A CKT BKR CAMERA 33AC 42FAB MRC MR A
02A SMOKE GENERATION MC M 000000000
02A TANK ASSY 95AAA MCA MC 1
02A PUMP-FUEL 95AAD MCB MC A
02A VALVE-SOLENOID 95AAE MCC MC A
02A SWITCH OFF-ON 9995A MCD MC A
02A CKT BKR-SMOKE PUMP33AC 42FAB MCE MC A
02B PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE MD M 000000000
02B LOUDSPEAKER 69BA1 MOA MD 8
02B DRIVE UNIT 69EAA MDB MD 8
02B AMPLIFIER 33EAK 69BE1 MDC MD 5
02B CONTROL UNIT 69BF1 MDD MD 3
02B DISTRIBUTION PANEL 69BG1 MDE MD 8
02B RECORDER UNIT 69BH1 MDF MD 5
02B CKT BKR 42FCD MDG MD A
02B ELECT DISABLE CONTACTOR 9942C MDH MD A
02 LANDING GEAR N AAAAAA
02 EXTEND GEAR NA 00000000
02 ROLLING SUPPORT NB 1800000A
02 AXLE MAIN GEAR 13BAC NBA NB A
02 AXLE TUBE NOSE GEAR 13CAH NBB NB A
02 WHEEL 2EA MAIN 13EAA NBC NB 2
02 BEARING 2EA MAIN 13EAB NBD NB 6
02 TIRE 2 EA MAIN 13EAC NBE NB 1
02 TUBE 2 FA MAIN 13EAD NBF NB 1
02 WHEEL NOSE 13EBA NBG NB 2
02 BEARING NOSE 13EBB NBH NB 1
02 TIRE NOSE 13EBC NBJ NB 1
02 TUBE NOSE 13EBD NBK NB 1
02 SPRING STRUT 2EA MAIN 13BAB NBL NB A
02 SHOCK STRUT NOSE 13CAA NBM NB A
02 TRUNNION NOSE 13CAH NBN NB 0
02 CYLINDER-SHOCK STRUT NOSE 13CAC NBP NB 1
02 PISTON-SHOCK STRUT NOSE 13CAD NBQ NB 0
02 FORK NOSE 13CAK NBR NB A
02 PRESSURE DISTRIBUTION NC AAAAAA
02 PRESSURE DISTRIBUTION NC AAAAAA
02 POWER PACK 13ABA NCA NC 8
02 MANIFOLD 13ABB NCB NC A
02 LOCKOUT SOLENOID 13ACA NCC NC 1
02 ACTUATOR MAIN GEAR 13BBA NCD NC 8
02 ACTUATOR HOSE GEAR 13CBA NCE NC 8
02 HOSE LH MH GR WHL DR CLOSE 13EBF NCF NC 1
02 HOSE LH MH GR WHL DR OPEN 13EBG NCG NC 1
02 HOSE RH MV GR WHL DR CLOSE 13EBH NCH NC 1

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FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

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12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
02 HOSE RH MN GR WHL GR OPEN 13B8J NCJ NC 1
02 HOSE NOSE GR DR ACT OPEN 13CBK NCK NC 1
02 HOSE NOSE GR DR ACT CLOSE 13CBL NCL NC 1
02 ACTUATOR-MN GR DOORS 13CCA NCM NC 8
02 ACTUATOR-NOSE GR DOORS 13CCB NCN NC 8
02 ACTUATOR-MN GEAR STRUT OP 13CCC NCP NC 8
02 RETRACT GEAR ND N 000000000
02 MAIN GEAR AND DOORS DOWN NE NA AAAAAAAAAA
02 SADDLE 2EA 13CAA NEA NE 0
02 DOWNLOCK 2EA 13CAD NEC NF A
02 DOWNLOCK ADJ SUPPORT 2EA 13CAF NED NF 8
02 UPLOCK HOOK 2EA 13CAJ NEE NE 1
02 U JOINT ASSY 2EA 13CAL NEF NE 1
02 LINKAGE 2EA 13CAM NEG NE 1
02 DOOR ASSY 2EA 13CAA NEH NE 0
02 DOOR ASSY STRT 2EA 13CAB NEJ NE 0
02 NOSE GEAR AND DOORS DOWN NF NA AAAAAAAAAA
02 UPLOCK HOOK 13CAG NFA NF 1
02 DOWNLOCK HOOK 13CAJ NFB NF 1
02 COLLAR LOCKING AND SPRING 13CAL NFC NF 0
02 WHEEL STOP BUMPER 11ACA NFD NF 0
02 DOOR ASSY 13CAF NFE NF 0
02 CIRCUIT BREAKER 42FAB NFF NF 0
02 SQUAT SWITCH 13CCC NFG NF 0
02 EXTEND ACTUATION NG NA AAAAAAAAAA
02 EXTEND ACTUATION NG NU FAAAAAAAAA
02 LDG CONTROL 13AAA NGA NG A
02 LINKAGE 13AAB NGB NG 8
02 HANDLE UP-DOWN SWITCH 13ACB NGC NG A
02 ACTUATOR DOWNLOCK MN GEAR 13ABB NGD NG 8
02 ACTUATOR UPLOCK RELEASE 13ABC NGF NG 8
02 HOSE MN STRUT DOOR OPEN 13BPE NGF NG 1
02 HOSE LH MN GR DOWNLOCK LOCK 13BBM NGG NG 1
02 HOSE RH MN GR DOWNLOCK LOCK 13BBQ NGH NG 1
02 ACTUATOR UPLOCK REL NOSE 13CHC NGJ NG 8
02 HOSE NOSE STRUT ACT EXTEND 13CPN NGK NG 1
02 NORMAL PRESSURE NJ NK 111111111
02 HYDRAULIC PUMP 13ABC NJA NJ A
02 EMERGENCY PRESSURE NK NC K NJ AAAAAAAAAA
02 HAND PUMP EMERGENCY 13ABE NKA NK A
02 LEVER-EMERGENCY HAND PUMP 13AFP NKB NK A
02 RETRACT ACTUATE NL ND AAAAAAAAAA
02 RETRACT ACTUATE NL NU F111111111
02 LDG CONTROL 13AAA NLA NL A
02 LINKAGE 13AAB NLB NL 8
02 HANDLE UP-DOWN SWITCH 13ACB NLC NL A
02 HOSE LH MN GR DOWNLOCK UNLK 13BBK NLD NL 1
02 HOSE LH MN GR DOWNLOCK UNLK 13BBL NLE NL 1
02 HOSE RH MN GR DOWNLOCK UNLK 13BBN NLF NL 1
02 HOSE RH MN GR DOWNLOCK UNLK 13BBP NLG NL 1

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FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

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12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
02 NOSE NOSE STRUT ACT RETRAC13CBM NLH NL 1
02 NOSE GEAR AND DOORS UP NM ND AAAAAAAAAA
02 UPLOCK HOOK 13CAG NMA NM 1
02 DOWNLOCK HOOK 13CAJ NMB NM 1
02 COLLAR LOCKING AND SPRING 13CAL NMC NM A
02 WHEEL STOP BUMPER 11ACA NMD NM 0
02 DOOR ASSY 13DAF NME NM 0
02 CIRCUIT BREAKER 42FAB NMF NM A
02 SQUAT SWITCH 13CCC NMG NM 0
02 MAIN GEAR AND DOORS UP NN ND AAAAAAAAAA
02 SADDLE 13BAA NNA NN 0
02 DOWNLOCK HOOK 13BAD NNB NN 1
02 DOWNLOCK ADJ SUPPORT 13BAF NNC NN 8
02 UPLOCK HOOK 13BAJ NND NN 1
02 U JOINT ASSY 2EA 13BAL NNE NN A
02 LINKAGE 2EA 13PAM NNF NN 1
02 DOOR ASSY 2EA 13DAA NNG NN 0
02 DOOR ASSY STRUT 2EA 13DAB NNH NN 0
02 NOSE MAIN STRUT DR CLOSED 13PBD NNJ NN 1
02 LDG UNSAFE INDICATION NU NA I NG 111111111
02 SWITCH WNG HORN DISABLE 13ACE NUA NU 1
02 SWITCH GEAR WNG THROTTLE 13ACF NUH NU 1
02 GEAR TRANSIT AND UP LIGHT 13ACG NUC NU 1
02 GEAR DOWN LIGHT 13ACH NUD NU 1
02 RELAY GD DISABLE WNG HORN 13ACJ NUE NU 1
02 SWITCH-UPLOCK MAIN GEAR 13BCA NUG NU 1
02 SWITCH-DOWNLOCK MAIN GEAR 13BCB NUH NU 1
02 SWITCH UPLOCK 13CCA NUJ NU 1
02 SWITCH-DOWNLOCK NOSE GEAR 13CCB NUK NU 1
02 CIRCUIT BREAKER 2EA 42FAB NUL NU 1
02 WARNING RELAY 2GD DISABLE<13ACD NUM NU 0
02 60VA AC DIST UAA CCO AAAAAAAAAA
02 60VA AC DIST UAA CCF FAAAAAAAAAAA
02 60VA AC DIST UAA CCH FAAAAAAAAAAA
02 60VA AC DIST UAA CCJ FAAAAAAAAAAA
02 60VA AC DIST UAA CCP AAAAAAAAAA
02A 60VA AC DIST UAA CCQ SAAAAAAAAAAA
02A 60VA AC DIST UAA CCR FAAAAAAAAAAA
02A 60 VA AC DIST UAA CCT FAAAAAAAAAAA
02B 60 VA AC DIST UAA CCT AAAAAAAAAA
02A 60VA AC DIST UAA DQ AAAAAAAAAA
02A SELECTOR SWITCH INVERTER 9942A UAA UAA 5
02B INVERTER 42FAG UAAB UAA A
02B CKT BKR GYRO POWER 42FAB UAAC UAA A
02A 60 VA AC SVS NO 1 UAB UAA K UAC AAAAAAAAAA
02A INVERTER 42FAG UAAB UAB A
02A CKT BKR INV PWR NO 1 42FAB UAAB UAB A
02A 60 VA AC SVS NO2 UAC UAA K UAB AAAAAAAAAA
02A INVERTER 42FAG UACA UAC A
02A CKT BKR INV PWR NO 2 42FAB UACB UAC A

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PG6095.JIRI DATE = 01/12/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

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00000000011111111122222222233333333344444444455555555566666666677777777778
1234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
02 400 VA AC DIST UAD CRA AAAAAAAAAA
02 400 VA AC DIST UAD CCG AAAAAAAAAA
02 CKT BKR 42FCD UADA UAD A
02 INVERTER 42FAJ 42FAH UADB UAD A
02 INVERTER 42FAH 42FAJ UADC UAD A
02A RELAY INVERTER 42FCH UADD UAD 8
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA LBHX FAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA RBHX FAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA LBJX AAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA RBJX AAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA LRKA AAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA RBKA AAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA LRN AAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA RBN AAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA LRRF AAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA RBRF AAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA LRSC AAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA PRSC AAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA CAL AAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA DL AAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA DP AAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA DU AAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA DV FAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA EA AAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA FAF AAAAAAAAAA
02A PRIMARY DC BUS UDA FCG AAAAAAAAAA
02A PRIMARY DC BUS UDA MAG AAAAAAAAAA
02A PRIMARY DC BUS UDA MAJ AAAAAAAAAA
02A PRIMARY DC BUS UDA MB AAAAAAAAAA
02A PRIMARY DC BUS UDA MC AAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA NF 00000000
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA NL AAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC POWER UDA NU AAAAAAAAAA
02A PRIMARY DC BUS UDA UAA SAAAAAAAAA
02A PRIMARY DC BUS UDA UAA AAAAAAAAAA
02A PRIMARY DC BUS UDA UAH FAAAAAAAAA
02A PRIMARY DC BUS UDA UAC FAAAAAAAAA
02 PRIMARY DC BUS UDA UDH FAAAAAAAAA
02 JUNCTION BOX FWD 42FHO UDAA 1
02 TERMINAL STRIP 42FRH UDAB 0
02 CKT BKR PANEL 42FAF UDAC 0
02 RELAY 42FAD UDA0 0
02 JUNCTION BOX REAR 42FCO UDAE 1
02 TERMINAL STRIP 42FCE UDAF 0
02 FILTER 42FCR UDAG 0
02B VOLTMETER 42GAA UDAH 0
02 DC ELECTRONICS DIST UDB CAH SAAAAAAAAA
02 DC ELECTRONICS DIST UDR CAI AAAAAAAAAA
02 DC ELECTRONICS DIST UDB CAE FAAAAAAAAA
02 DC ELECTRONICS DIST UDR CAF FAAAAAAAAA

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PGG095.JIR1 DATE = 01/12/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

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0000000001111111112222222222333333333344444444445555555555666666666677777777778
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
02 DC ELECTRONICS DIST UDB CAG FAAAAAAAAA
02 DC ELECTRONICS DIST UDB CB SAAAAAAAAA
02 DC ELECTRONICS DIST UDB CBA FAAAAAAAAA
02A DC ELECTRONICS DIST UDB CBH FAAAAAAAAA
02 DC ELECTRONICS DIST UDB CCH S77777777
02 DC ELECTRONICS DIST UDB CCD FAAAAAAAAA
02 DC ELECTRONICS DIST UDB CCM FAAAAAAAAA
02B DC ELECTRONICS DIST UDB MD AAAAAAAAAA
02 DC ELECTRONICS BUS UDB UAD AAAAAAAAAA
02 JUNCTION BOX REAR 42FC0 UDBA UDB 1
02 TERMINAL STRIP 42FCE UDBB UDB 0
02 FILTER 42FCH UDBC UDB 0
02B ELECT DISABLE CONTACTOR 9942C UDBD UDB 1
02 NORMAL SOURCE UDC UDA UDE 111111111
02 NORMAL SOURCE UDC UDK AAAAAAAAAA
02 FRONT ALT SUPPLY LUDD UDC KRUDD AAAAAAAAAA
02 REAR ALT SUPPLY RUDD UDC KLUDD AAAAAAAAAA
02 GEAR DRIVEN ALT 42AAA LUDDA LUDD A
02 GEAR DRIVEN ALT 42AAA RUDDA RUDD A
02 DRIVE 42AAB LUDDB LUDD A
02 DRIVE 42AAB RUDDB RUDD A
02A ALT ASSY BELT DRIVEN 42AAE RUDDC RUDD A
02A ARM ALT ADJUST 42AAF RUDDO RUDD 1
02A BELT ALT DRIVE 42AAG RUDDF RUDD A
02A SUPPORT ASSY 42AAH RUDDF RUDD 1
02A SHOCK MOUNT 42AAJ RUDDG RUDD 0
02A PULLEY PROP SHAFT 42AAK RUDDH RUDD A
02 ALTERNATOR SWITCH 42CAA LUDDJ LUDD A
02 ALTERNATOR SWITCH 42CAA RUDDJ RUDD A
02 CKT BKR 42FAB LUDDK LUDD A
02 CKT BKR 42FAB RUDDK RUDD A
02 ALT SHUNT 42FAC LUDDL LUDD A
02 ALT SHUNT 42FAC RUDDL RUDD A
02 SUPPRESSOR 42CAF LUDDM LUDD 8
02 SUPPRESSOR 42CAF RUDDM RUDD 9
02 EMERGENCY SOURCE UDE UDA K UDC AAAAAAAAAA
02 BATTERY SHUNT 42FAC UDEA UDE A
02 BATTERY SHUNT 42FAC UDEA UDK A
02B CONTROL/REGULATION UDF UDC AAAAAAAAAA
02A CONTROL/REGULATION LUDD LUDD AAAAAAAAAA
02A CONTROL/REGULATION RUDD RUDD AAAAAAAAAA
02B VOLTAGE REGULATOR 42CAC UDFA UDF 1
02A VOLTAGE REGULATOR 42CAC LUDDF LUDD 8
02A VOLTAGE REGULATOR 42CAC RUDDF RUDD 8
02B AMMETER 42GAB UDFB UDF 0
02A AMMETER 42GAB LUDDF LUDD 0
02A AMMETER 42GAB RUDDF RUDD 0
02B SWITCH REG SELECT 42CAD UDFC UDF 8
02A FIELD CURRENT SOURCE UDG UDC SAAAAAAAAA
02A FIELD CURRENT SOURCE UDG LUDD FAAAAAAAAA

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PGG095.JIR1 DATE = 01/12/76

FLIGHT SAFETY PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

0000000001111111112222222222333333333344444444445555555555666666666677777777778
12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890

02A	FIELD CURRENT SOURCE		UDG	RUDD		FAAAAAAAAA
02B	FIELD CURRENT SOURCE		UDG	UDF		AAAAAAAAA
02	OVERVOLTAGE RELAY	42GAG	UDGA	UDG		8
02H	ALT RUN/STRY SW	42CAE	UDGB	UDG		A
02	NORMAL SOURCE		UDH	UDG	UDJ	111111111
02	ALT FIELD CKT BKR	42FAB	UDHA	UDH		A
02	BATT/MASTER SW	42EAE	UDHB	UDH		A
02	EMERGENCY SOURCE		UDJ	UDG	K UDH	AAAAAAAAA
02A	RESTART SWITCH	42CAB	UDJA	UDJ		A
02A	RECT DIODES	42EAF	UDJB	UDJ		5
02B	DIODE	42EAF	UDJC	UDJ		A
02B	FUSE	9942B	UDJD	UDJ		A
02	BUS-TO-BUS CONNECTION		UDK	UDB	UDL	111111111
02	BATTERY CONNECTION		UDL	UDB	K UDK	AAAAAAAAA
02	BATTERY CONNECTION		UDL	UDE		AAAAAAAAA
02	BATTERY CONTACTOR	42EAD	UDLA	UDL		A
02	DIODE	42EAF	UDLB	UDL		5
02	BATT/MASTER SWITCH	42EAF	UDLC	UDL		A
02A	BATTERY SUPPLY		UDM	MAH		AAAAAAAAA
02B	BATTERY SUPPLY		UDM	UDJ		FAAAAAAAAAA
02	BATTERY SUPPLY		UDM	UDL		AAAAAAAAA
02	BATT, LEAD ACID	42EAA	UDMA	UDM		6
02A	BATT NICAD	42EAH	UDMB	UDM		6
02	BATT BOX	42EAC	UDMC	UDM		0
02	EXTERNAL POWER		UDN	UDB		000000000
02	EXTERNAL POWER		UDN	UDE		000000000
02	RECEPTACLE	42FAA	UDNA	UDN		8
02A	CONTACTOR	42FAK	UDNB	UDN		A
02A	DIODE	9942F	UDNC	UDN		A
02A	RESISTOR, EXT POWER	9942E	UDND	UDN		A
02A	FUSE EXT POWER	9942D	UDNE	UDN		A

CARD COUNT IS 00001380. CARDS WITH ERRORS 00000000